

LOWELL DECL. EX. 19

DR. MATTHEW LEVITT

Senior Fellow and Director, Reinhard Program on Counterterrorism and Intelligence,
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, and Adjunct Professor at Georgetown
University's Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service

EXPERT DECLARATION

I. SCOPE OF ENGAGEMENT

I have been asked by Plaintiffs' counsel in the case of *Shatsky v. Palestine Liberation Organization, et al.*, 1:18-cv-12355-MKV-DCF (S.D.N.Y.), to provide my professional opinions concerning the matters discussed below and contained herein, in support of Plaintiffs' Opposition to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment.

My opinions, as set forth below, are based upon my academic studies, research, field research, travel in the Middle East, and work in counterterrorism intelligence over the course of many years, focusing on Middle East terrorism and the Israeli-Palestinian peace process, among other issues.. During my career, I have obtained information from numerous sources, including experts, officials, academics and others; and academic and professional lectures and review of court records, books, newspapers, and academic and policy journals. I have also researched these materials on the internet (including the websites, video and audio clips and images on counterterrorism sites, and sites controlled by terrorist groups and their sympathizers).

I am being compensated \$550.00 per hour in this case, regardless of the outcome of the litigation. I have no prior or current professional or personal connection with any of the parties in this cases precluding my ability to provide impartial evidence herein.

II. SUMMARY OF OPINIONS

Based on my knowledge, experience, training and education, and drawing on my own extensive research, my expert opinion is that the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) remains a terrorist group and is so-designated by both the United States and the European Union.

The PFLP blends Marxist-Leninist ideology with Palestinian and Arab nationalism as the basis for its violent campaign to destroy Israel and remove Western capitalism. The PFLP has been responsible for many terrorist attacks over the years, including airplane hijackings, shooting attacks, and suicide bombings. The PFLP grew into the second largest constituent element of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), after Yaser Arafat's own Fatah party. The PFLP rejected the Madrid peace conference in 1991 and the Oslo Accords in 1993. In September 2000, the "al Aqsa Intifada" (also known as the "Second Intifada") erupted after the failure of the Camp David Accords and the PFLP increased the tempo of its campaign of terrorist attacks. The group continues to engage in such attacks today.

There is broad consensus that the PFLP carried out the February 16, 2002, bombing attack at a pizza parlor in which Keren Shatsky and Rachel Thaler were murdered, and Leor Thaler, Hillel Trattner, Ronit Trattner, Steven Braun, and Chana Friedman were injured. The

explosion killed one more person, and injured many more. The PA and PLO's decades-long provision of material support to the PFLP in the years prior to that attack directly contributed to the group's organizational and operational ability, circa 2002, to carry out such a terrorist attack. The fact that the PA/PLO gave the PFLP free rein in PA-controlled territories is itself a significant form of assistance, given that absent a local geographic platform the PFLP's operational abilities in the West Bank would have been severely limited.

Not only was the Palestinian Authority (PA) in a position to prevent acts of terrorism by PLO component member groups such as the PFLP, it also supported such terrorist activities at the time in question. While it sometimes opposed the terrorist activities of such groups, usually more in word than deed, such opposition was temporary in nature.

Moreover, the PA incentivized terrorism through payments to the families of "martyrs" and prisoners, not to mention support to militant groups. In 2002, then-Secretary of State Colin Powell bemoaned the twisted nature of such benevolence and underscored the U.S. government position that such financial support provides incentives for terrorism. "I think it's a real problem when you incentivize in any way suicide bombings."¹

As a component element of the PLO, and in often close cooperation with the PA, the PFLP was uniquely positioned to leverage its formal and informal relationships with these groups and their leaders to secure funding, weapons, safe haven, and a variety of forms of support for its acts of terrorism and political violence.

III. **QUALIFICATIONS**

My qualifications as a noted expert in international terrorism, with a focus on Middle East terrorist groups and particular expertise in their logistical and financial support networks, are based on a multidisciplinary combination of my academic education, professional training and experience.

I am a United States citizen, residing in the Washington, D.C. area. I hold both a Masters of Law and Diplomacy (MALD) and a Ph.D. in International Relations from The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University. The Fletcher School, a member of the Association of Professional Schools of International Affairs and one of the preeminent graduate programs in international affairs in the United States, is renowned for its interdisciplinary curriculum and approach to international studies.

My Masters degree included concentrations in Conflict Resolution, International Security Studies, and the Middle East. My doctoral dissertation entitled "The Impact of Acute Security Crises on the Process of Ongoing Negotiations," examines the impact of terrorism on the Arab-Israeli peace process. The dissertation examines acts of terrorism carried out by both Islamic and Jewish terrorists. I was awarded several fellowships and grants in support of this research, including a graduate research fellowship from the Program on Negotiation at Harvard Law School. While at Harvard I conducted extensive field research in the West Bank and Gaza

¹ Colin L. Powell, interview by Tony Snow, *Fox News Sunday*, Fox News Channel, June 30, 2002

Strip. In a letter supporting my application for funding for my doctoral work, an assistant director of the FBI described the project as one that “will be of great benefit to the FBI and the U.S. Intelligence Community (USIC).”

Prior to joining the Washington Institute, I served as a counterterrorism intelligence analyst with the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) providing tactical and strategic analysis in support of counterterrorism operations. There I developed a special focus on fundraising and logistical support networks for Middle East terrorist groups. In addition, I participated as a team member in a number of crisis situations, including the terrorist threat surrounding the turn of the millennium and the September 11 attacks. In my official capacity as a U.S. government intelligence analyst, I researched and analyzed trends and patterns of international terrorist groups, produced written products and oral presentations for FBI management, FBI field agents and other agencies, and liaised with U.S. intelligence community counterparts, other U.S. government agencies, and foreign services. In this capacity I also made several trips to the Middle East. Indicative of my expertise, I earned three letters of commendation for my analytical contributions to FBI counterterrorism operations, as well as five awards in recognition of superior service rendered to the FBI.

In November 2001 I joined The Washington Institute for Near East Policy as a Senior Fellow in Terrorism Studies. Founded in 1985, The Washington Institute seeks to “advance a balanced and realistic understanding of American interests in the Middle East” by bringing “scholarship to bear on the making of U.S. policy in this vital region of the world.” The Institute’s Board of Advisors includes several former Secretaries of State, a former Director of Central Intelligence, and other former senior government officials and diplomats. The Washington Institute holds annual conferences and periodic policy forums, hosts blue-ribbon presidential study groups, and publishes scholarly research.

From November 2005 through January 2007 I served as Deputy Assistant Secretary for Intelligence and Analysis in the United States Department of the Treasury. In that capacity, I served both as a senior official within the department’s terrorism and financial intelligence branch and as deputy chief of the Office of Intelligence and Analysis, one of sixteen U.S. intelligence agencies coordinated under the Office of the Director of National Intelligence. During my tenure at Treasury, I was at the center of the government’s efforts to protect the U.S. financial system from abuse and to deny terrorists, weapons proliferators, and other rogue actors the ability to finance threats to U.S. national security. In recognition of exceptional service to the department, in January 2007 I was awarded the Treasury Department’s “Exceptional Service Award.” In 2008-2009 I also served as an advisor on counterterrorism and intelligence for the U.S. State Department’s Special Envoy Middle East Regional Security (SEMERS) whose mission was to help achieve the Secretary of State’s vision of resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict through two states living side by side in peace and security.

In February 2007 I returned to the Washington Institute, where I am a Senior Fellow and Director of the since renamed Stein Program on Counterterrorism and Intelligence. In this capacity, I am frequently sought after as an analyst and commentator on terrorism issues for major media outlets including CNN, ABC, NBC, CBS, PBS, The New York Times, The Washington Post, The Wall Street Journal, National Public Radio, BBC, al Jazeera, al Arabiya,

and more. I have lectured and consulted on terrorism for a variety of government and other organizations, including the U.S. Departments of State, Homeland Security and Justice, the Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (9-11 Commission), the Financial Transactions Reports Analysis Centre of Canada (FINTRAC), the Canadian Security and Intelligence Service, Department of Justice Canada, and others, and write frequent policy briefs and articles on issues relating to terrorism and U.S. policy.

I am an Adjunct Professor in the security studies program at Georgetown University's Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service, and I have also taught as a Professorial Lecturer in International Relations and Strategic Studies at Johns Hopkins University's School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS).

I am widely published. Along with a collection of journal articles and edited volumes, I am also the author of *Targeting Terror* (Washington Institute, 2002), *Hamas: Politics, Charity and Terrorism in the Service of Jihad* (Yale University Press, 2006), *Negotiating under Fire: Preserving Peace Talks in the Face of Terror Attacks* (Rowman & Littlefield, 2008) and *Hezbollah: The Global Footprint of Lebanon's Party of God* (Georgetown University Press, 2013). A full list of my books, monographs, academic journal articles, policy journal articles, editorials, and policy briefs is available in my professional C.V.

At The Washington Institute my work includes the study of Middle Eastern terrorist groups, front organizations and state sponsors, the logistical and financial support networks that facilitate their activities, and the extremist and militant ideologies that drive their recruitment and radicalization efforts. In my efforts to study and understand terrorism and militant Islamist ideology I interview experts, officials, academics and others with insight into these issues, both in the United States and Europe and in the Middle East. I engage in private, personal meetings, public conferences, group discussions, and talks that are both on and off the record. I travel to the Middle East regularly, including trips to the Palestinian territories, Israel, Jordan, Egypt, Bahrain, Qatar, the UAE and Turkey. I also attend conferences and academic and professional lectures, and read books, newspapers, academic and policy journals, and research these materials on the internet (including the websites, video and audio clips and images on sites geared towards counterterrorism and those of terrorist groups and their sympathizers as well). These are the standard sources and methods in the academic and policy communities for developing the kind of specialized knowledge and expertise I have accumulated – and for which I have been awarded and commended – in my field.

Compiling information from sources such as these, I study and evaluate the information and data I collect, and write about and lecture on my findings. I engage in regular discussions with other experts both to compare notes and as a means of affording myself an ongoing process of peer-review and fact-checking. When providing expert testimony in criminal court cases, I also review evidence provided by the prosecution.

The United States Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals has described my research methodology as “the gold standard.”² And, in a watershed ruling upholding the constitutionality of the material

² See Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals ruling in US v. Damrah, at <http://ftp.resource.org/courts.gov/c/F3/412/412.F3d.618.04-4216.html>

support statute, 18 U.S.C. §2339B, the Supreme Court of the United States cited my work twice to support its position.³

The awards and honors I have received include:

- U.S. Embassy Expert Speaker Grant, U.S. Embassy Berlin, May 2019
- Certificate of Recognition, U.S. Department of Justice, October 2015;
- Certificate of Appreciation, U.S. Secret Service, 2015;
- Letter of Appreciation, U.S. Marine Corps Forces Cyber Command, April 3, 2013;
- Certificate of Appreciation, U.S. Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation, March, 2013
- U.S. Department of State “Counter-Terrorism Policy” Speaker Grant (lectures in Germany), January 2010;
- Ministry of Interior, Kingdom of Bahrain, Award Certificate, February 25, 2009;
- *Hamas: Politics, Charity and Terrorism in the Service of Jihad* selected as a 2007 Top Seller in Politics and Law as compiled by YBP Library Service;
- *Hamas: Politics, Charity and Terrorism in the Service of Jihad* selected as a 2007 AAUP University Press Book for Public and Secondary School Libraries;
- Exceptional Service Award, U.S. Department of the Treasury, January 2007
- Certificate of Appreciation, United States Central Command Directorate of Intelligence, February 2006
- Selected by CNN as one of “The 2005 New Guard: Washington’s Next Generation of Newsmakers,” April 2005
- European Union Visitors Program (EUVP), 2005
- Visiting Scholar, Security Studies Department, the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS), Johns Hopkins University, March 2003
- U.S. Department of State Speaker and Specialist Grant (2), April 2002 (lectures in Lithuania), and January 2003 (lectures in Austria)

³ See SCOTUS opinion in Humanitarian Law Project et al v. Holder et al, Pp25-26, at <http://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/09pdf/08-1498.pdf>

- Letters of Commendation from Deputy Assistant Director (3), Federal Bureau of Investigation, July 2000, August 2000, July 2001
- Performance Awards (2), Federal Bureau of Investigation, December 1999, November 2000
- Special Act or Service Award, Federal Bureau of Investigation, September 1999
- Graduate Research Fellow, The Program On Negotiation at Harvard Law School, 1997-1998
- International Security Studies Fellow, International Security Studies Ph.D. Dissertation Fellowship, the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, 1996-1997
- International Security Studies Program Graduate Student Research Grant on the Emerging Issues of Ethnic, Sectarian, and Religious Conflict, William H. Donner Foundation, 1996
- Doctoral Scholarship, the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, 1995-1996
- Sarah Scaife Frank Rockwell Barnett Memorial Grant in International Security Studies, The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, 1994 and 1996

In addition to my work at The Washington Institute, I use my specialized expertise to teach and consult, for the U.S. and other governments, and private sector firms. I was a member of the Council on Foreign Relations' task force on terrorist financing and sat on the academic advisory board for the Emirates Center for Strategic Studies and Research (ECSSR). I am a member of several think tank advisory boards, including the Institute for Counter-Terrorism (ICT) in Israel; the Center on Economic and Financial Power at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies in Washington, D.C.; the RESOLVE Network Research Advisory Council at the United Institute for Peace in Washington, D.C.; the Centre for Financial Crime and Security Studies at the Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies in London; and the International Centre for Political Violence & Terrorism Research (ICPVTR) in Singapore. I have also served as a CTC Fellow at the Combating Terrorism Center (CTC) at the U.S. Military Academy (West Point) and as a senior fellow at The George Washington University's Homeland Security Policy Institute, and am a life member of The Council on Foreign Relations.

I am frequently called upon to testify before the United States Senate and House of Representatives as an expert on international terrorism, countering violent extremism, militant Islam, and terrorist financing. I have also testified before the Canadian Parliament and the European (EU) Parliament on terrorism-related issues. I have been qualified as an expert witness and provided expert testimony in many U.S. federal court proceedings, in several terrorism-related immigration cases in the U.S. and Canada, as well as in terrorism-related cases in Denmark, France, Peru, and Scotland. Several of these cases specifically focused on the PFLP.

IV. **EXPERT OPINIONS**

A. PFLP Carried out the February 16, 2002, Pizzeria Bombing

There is broad consensus that the PFLP carried out the February 16, 2002, pizzeria bombing in Karnei Shomron, and that the group claimed responsibility for this attack. For example, the U.S. State Department's Office of the Historian compiled a list of "Significant Terrorist Incidents, 1961-2003: A Brief Chronology." Among the entries on this list is the following:

Suicide Bombing in the West Bank, February 16, 2002: A suicide bombing in an outdoor food court in Karnei Shomron killed 4 persons and wounded 27. Two of the dead and two of the wounded were U.S. citizens. The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) claimed responsibility.⁴

Similarly, the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs has also documented that the PFLP carried out this attack:

Two teenagers were killed and about 30 people were wounded, six seriously, when a suicide bomber blew himself up on Saturday night at a pizzeria in the shopping mall in Karnei Shomron in Samaria. A third person subsequently died of his injuries. The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine claimed responsibility for the attack.⁵

In a report on suicide bombing attacks targeting Israeli civilians, entitled "Erased in a Moment," Human Rights Watch notes that "as of the end of August 2002, the PFLP had claimed responsibility for three suicide bombing attacks against civilians."⁶

On February 16, 2002, a suicide bomber blew himself up in a shopping mall on the West Bank settlement of Karnei Shomron, killing three teenagers and injuring around thirty. The attack was claimed by the Abu 'Ali Mustafa Brigades of the PFLP in a statement announcing that the bomber, Sadiq 'Abd al-Hafiz, had come from the West Bank town of Qalqiliya. The second attack, injuring fifteen people, targeted the lobby of a hotel on the outskirts of the Ariel settlement on March 7. In the third attack, on May 19, the suicide bomber disguised himself as an Israeli soldier and blew himself up at a Netanya open-air market, killing three and wounding fifty-nine. Hamas also claimed responsibility for this attack.⁷

⁴ "Significant Terrorist Incidents, 1961-2003: A Brief Chronology," U.S. Department of State, Office of the Historian, Bureau of Public Affairs, March 2004, <https://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/ho/pubs/fs/5902.htm>

⁵ "Suicide and Other Bombing Attacks in Israel Since the Declaration of Principles (September 1993)," Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, <https://mfa.gov.il/mfa/foreignpolicy/terrorism/palestinian/pages/suicide%20and%20other%20bombing%20attacks%20in%20israel%20since.aspx>

⁶ "Erased in a Moment: Suicide Bombing Attacks Against Israeli Civilians," Human Rights Watch, October 2002, <https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/ISRAELPA1002.pdf>

⁷ "Erased in a Moment: Suicide Bombing Attacks Against Israeli Civilians," Human Rights Watch, October 2002, <https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/ISRAELPA1002.pdf>

Moreover, Human Rights Watch concluded that “the PFLP, which has claimed responsibility for car bombings as well as several suicide bombings that targeted civilians, appears to have a similar degree of internal cohesion and centralized authority, thus making its leadership also criminally liable.”⁸

Prominent media outlets have also covered the PFLP’s involvement in this attack. For example, a CNN timeline of attacks since the start of the Al Aqsa Intifada includes this entry:

February 16, 2002: Two people were killed and about 30 were wounded when a suicide bomber blew himself up at a shopping mall in a West Bank Jewish settlement. A third person died later of his injuries. The PFLP claimed responsibility for the attack.⁹

Over the course of the Second *Intifada*, elements of the Palestinian Authority both actively and passively supported terrorist activities. PA officials and agencies not only officially tolerated terrorist activity, they also funded, armed, and at times cooperated with terrorist groups, including the PFLP. As such, the attack at Karnei Shomron was consistent with the overall strategy, goals, and policy of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (“PFLP”), Palestine Liberation Organization (“PLO”) and PA at the time.

B. PFLP Background

The PFLP was founded by George Habash, a Palestinian doctor, in December 1967, as a breakaway from the Arab Nationalist Movement (ANM) in the wake of the Arab defeat in the Six Day War. Shortly after its establishment in 1968, several splinter groups broke off from the PFLP. For example, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine – General Command (PFLP-GC) was founded by Ahmed Jibril in 1968 and the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP) was founded in 1969 by Nayef Hawatmeh.¹⁰ The PFLP includes a military wing called the Red Eagles, also known as the Red Eagle Group, the Red Eagle Gang, the Halhul Gang, the Halhul Squad, and Palestine Popular Resistance Forces or PPRF.¹¹ Other well-known names for the PFLP military wing are the Jihad Jibril Brigades and the Abu Ali Mustapha Brigades (see below).

According to Human Rights Watch (HRW), “the PFLP has not claimed any separation between its military wing and its political leaders.”¹² Indeed, as Harold Cubert notes in his book on the PFLP, “the PFLP has given the political apparatus a military structure and considers it a

⁸ “Erased in a Moment: Suicide Bombing Attacks Against Israeli Civilians,” Human Rights Watch, October 2002, <https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/ISRAELPA1002.pdf>

⁹ “Attacks Since Start of Al Aqsa Intifada: A CNN Timeline,” CNN, June 21, 2002, <https://www.cnn.com/2002/WORLD/meast/06/20/terror.attacks.chronology/>

¹⁰ U.S. State Department 2007 Country Reports on Terrorism, published April 2008, <http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/crt/2007/103714.htm>

¹¹ U.S. State Department 2007 Country Reports on Terrorism, published April 2008, <http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/crt/2007/103714.htm>

¹² “Erased in a Moment: Suicide Bombing Attacks Against Israeli Civilians,” Human Rights Watch, October 2002

reserve for the military apparatus. Political operatives are expected to carry out military duties as needed.”¹³

As a result, Human Rights Watch concluded, PFLP leaders are themselves criminally liable for the group’s actions: “As with the other armed Palestinian groups that have intentionally and repeatedly organized suicide attacks against civilians, persons carrying out attacks on civilians claimed by the PFLP are individually criminally liable for their actions. PFLP leaders are also liable both directly and under the doctrine of command responsibility.”¹⁴ By extension, those who provide the PFLP with material support should logically be no less liable.

The PFLP’s primary goal is the destruction of Israel and creation of a Palestinian state in its place. The group has secondary goals as well, related both to the group’s Marxist-Leninist political orientation and its violent opposition to countries it sees as having helped establish and maintain the State of Israel. Harold Cubert, author of a book about the PFLP, explains:

The PFLP seeks to restore what it considers to be stolen territory to Palestinian sovereignty, to dismantle the state of Israel, to bring about the return of the Palestinian diaspora to its homeland, and to establish a ‘secular democratic state’ in Israel’s place.

This is the PFLP’s core aim and Israel is its principal adversary. However, the PFLP has also identified its ancillary foes; that is to say, countries which it believes facilitated the establishment of Israel and continue to ensure the Jewish state’s survival of the Jewish state [sic] through military and economic aid. The United States is the chief target in this category....

Other countries in the same category as the United States, but guilty to a lesser degree, including Britain and other western European nations such as France and Germany....¹⁵

The PFLP would also target Arab government interests as well, especially as its relations with Arab governments deteriorated over time. For the PFLP, “the road to Palestine passed through Amman”—effectively defining “the liberation of Jordan from the Hashemite regime as a prerequisite to the liberation of Palestine.”¹⁶ Nor was Jordan the only Arab target of the PFLP’s efforts to overthrow a government by force and violence. Consider, for example, the May 31, 1969, PFLP bombing of the Trans-Arabian Pipeline near Quneitra.¹⁷ For that matter, as Cubert notes, “for most of its existence, the PFLP has implemented a policy of targeting for assassination fellow Palestinians whose views and actions are inconsistent with its programme of recovering all Israeli-held territory.”¹⁸ In 1997, the year the PFLP was designated a terrorist group as an inaugural member of this new list, the State Department noted the PFLP’s targeting not only Israel but moderate Arab states as well: “PFLP has carried out numerous attacks against

¹³ Harold M. Cubert, *The PFLP’s Changing Role in the Middle East* (London: Frank Cass, 1997), p. 124-125

¹⁴ “Erased in a Moment: Suicide Bombing Attacks Against Israeli Civilians,” Human Rights Watch, October 2002, <https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/ISRAELPA1002.pdf>

¹⁵ Cubert, *The PFLP’s Changing Role in the Middle East*, p. ix

¹⁶ Avraham Sela, *The Decline of the Arab-Israeli Conflict: Middle East Politics and the Quest for Regional Order* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1998), Pp. 129-130

¹⁷ Cubert, *The PFLP’s Changing Role in the Middle East*, p. 135

¹⁸ Cubert, *The PFLP’s Changing Role in the Middle East*, p. 138

Israeli or moderate Arab targets, including the killing of a settler and her son in December 1996.”¹⁹

The PFLP soon officially joined the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), which was then emerging as the primary umbrella organization for nationalist Palestinian groups committed to “armed struggle” with Israel as the proper strategy to secure Palestinian statehood. The PFLP, an avowedly Marxist-Leninist organization but a key component member of the PLO, was the second largest faction within the PLO after the Fatah movement led by Yasser Arafat. Unlike some other Palestinian groups, however, the PFLP “tended to emphasize the integral links binding the Palestinian cause to the broader objective of revolution in the Arab world.”²⁰ To that end, the PFLP advocated for the overthrow of both the Israeli and several Arab governments by force and violence. For the PFLP, the Palestinian struggle was “part of the whole Arab liberation movement and the whole world liberation movement” and the struggle against Israel was “first of all a class struggle.”²¹

The PLO itself was not known to carry out terrorist attacks in its own name, but rather under the names of the “military wings” of its member factions such as Fatah’s Black September or the PFLP’s Red Eagles. One of the PFLP’s most infamous terrorist operatives, Captain Kamal Rafat, reportedly also became a Black September member and “coordinated PFLP input into joint operations under the auspices of Black September.”²² Jordan’s King Hussein reportedly survived at least seven PLO assassination attempts, two of which were carried out by the PFLP.²³ Over the years, PLO delegations to foreign countries would include leaders of the PFLP and other PLO factions, such as the November 13, 1979 talks PLO leaders held with Soviet leaders in Moscow. According to documents seized from PLO offices in Lebanon in 1982, PFLP official Taysir Qub'a was a member of the PLO delegation led by Yasser Arafat that met with Soviet foreign minister Gromyko and his delegation.²⁴ PFLP members were also part of a January 1981 delegation of 194 PLO officers and non-commissioned officers (NCOs) who arrived for a series of military courses.²⁵ Like other PLO constituent factions, the PFLP would be given militant assignments by the PLO. For example, a July 27, 1981, PLO document marked “Top Secret and Most Urgent” instructed PLO artillery units—including some from the PFLP—which Israeli towns were to be targeted by which artillery unit with how many munitions.²⁶

The PFLP is most famous for pioneering airplane hijackings, which it carried out in the late 1960s and 1970s. According to the U.S. State Department, the PFLP “earned a reputation

¹⁹ U.S. State Department, “Appendix B: Background Information on Terrorist Groups,” *Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1997*, published 1998, <http://www.state.gov/www/global/terrorism/1997Report/backg.html>

²⁰ William B. Quandt, Fuad Jabber and Ann Moseley Lesch, *The Politics of Palestinian Nationalism* (Berkley: University of California Press, 1973), p. 62

²¹ “Platform of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine—PFLP, 1969,” in Dr, Mahdi F. Abdul Hadi, editor, *Documents on Palestine, Volume I: From the Pre-Ottoman/Ottoman Period to the Prelude of the Madrid Middle East Peace Conference* (Jerusalem: Palestinian Academic Society for the Study of International Affairs, PASSIA, 1997) Pp. 217-219

²² Neil C. Livingstone and David Halevy, *Inside the PLO* (New York: William Morrow and Co, 1990), Pp. 204-205

²³ Neil C. Livingstone and David Halevy, *Inside the PLO* (New York: William Morrow and Co, 1990), Pp.81-82

²⁴ Raphael Israeli, Ed., *PLO in Lebanon: Selected Documents* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1983), p.34

²⁵ Raphael Israeli, Ed., *PLO in Lebanon: Selected Documents* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1983), p.103

²⁶ Raphael Israeli, Ed., *PLO in Lebanon: Selected Documents* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1983), p.210

for spectacular international attacks in the 1960s and 1970s, including airline hijackings that killed at least 20 U.S. citizens.”²⁷ Indeed, the 1970 hijacking of four airplanes to Dawson’s Field in Jordan by the PFLP was a turning point in the relationship between the Jordanian government and the revolutionary Palestinian groups then resident in Jordan, including the PFLP. This event led to the Jordanian crackdown on PLO associated groups in Jordan called the Black September Organization (BSO), which was closely tied to the PFLP. BSO drew recruits from the ranks of PLO constituent organizations that felt their groups were not engaging in enough militant operations, including operatives from Fatah and the PFLP. The effect was that “operationally, Fatah and elements of the Popular Front—differences were buried temporarily—came together in the planning and execution of a series of bloody terrorist coups that would in the minds of many in the West associate Arafat and the PLO leadership with violence and mayhem on a grand scale.”²⁸

In July 1982, the State Department’s Office for Combatting Terrorism issued a report entitled, “Terrorist Skyjackings: A Statistical Overview of Terrorist Skyjackings from January 1968 through June 1982.” The report noted that “The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) has attempted more skyjackings than any other group, and its skyjackings have often had major political consequences.” From 1968 to 1976, for example, the PFLP claimed responsibility for 13 skyjackings.²⁹

The PFLP was also responsible for a variety of attempted and successful attacks in Europe, including a time bomb found at a Berlin Jewish Community Center in 1969, an explosion at Marks and Spencers in London in 1969, and a booby-trapped car that exploded near the offices of the Jewish Welfare Organization for France in Paris in 1974.³⁰ The 1970 hijacking of four airplanes to Dawson’s Field in Jordan by the PFLP was a turning point in the relationship between the Jordanian government and the revolutionary Palestinian groups then resident in Jordan, including the PFLP and led to the Jordanian crackdown on PLO associated groups in Jordan called Black September. The PFLP split from the PLO in 1984, but returned in 1987.³¹

Although the PFLP would only be formally designated a terrorist entity many years later when the U.S. State and Treasury Department terrorism lists were founded, the U.S. government referred to the PFLP as a terrorist group engaged in terrorist attacks—including attacks against Americans—many years earlier. For example, note a now-declassified note for inclusion in the President’s Daily Brief (PDB) for February 18, 1969, which explicitly ties the PFLP to acts of terrorism. The note underscores the group’s refusal to join a “joint military council” with other Palestinian groups for fear that doing so might constrain its ability to act engage in such

²⁷ U.S. State Department 2007 Country Reports on Terrorism, published April 2008, <http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/crt/2007/103714.htm>

²⁸ Andrew Gowers and Tony Walker, *Arafat: The Biography* (London: Virgin, 2003), p. 120

²⁹ “Terrorist Skyjackings: A Statistical Overview of Terrorist Skyjackings from January 1968 through June 1982,” State Department, Office for Combatting Terrorism, July 1982, <https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/TERRORIST%20SKYJACKINGS%20JAN%5B15515031%5D.pdf>

³⁰ Raphael Israeli, Ed., *PLO in Lebanon: Selected Documents* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1983), Pp. 270-272

³¹ Neil C. Livingstone and David Halevy, *Inside the PLO* (New York: William Morrow and Co, 1990), p. 74

activities, which it euphemistically refers to as “independent political action.” In the “Middle East” section of the memorandum entitled “Major Problems,” the PDB note reads as follows:

Three of the Arab guerrilla organizations, including Al Fatah, announced today formation of a joint military command. Notable for its absence from the combine, however, was the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) which quickly accepted responsibility for yesterday’s attack on an El Al airliner in Zurich as well as the hijacking of an El Al plane last summer and the attack on an El Al craft in Athens in December. The PFLP reportedly stayed out because it did not want to give up independent political action.³²

Consider also a sampling of attacks tied to the PLO and its constituent groups, including Fatah/BSO, listed in a now-declassified CIA Memorandum entitled, “Chronologies of Significant Fedayeen and Non-Fedayeen Terrorist Incidents, 1 January 1968 – 15 October 1973.”³³

18 February 1969	PFLP Attacked El Al plan at Zurich, crew member wounded; one terrorist killed
25 February 1969	PFLP claims responsibility for bomb which exploded at British Consulate Jerusalem
28 August 1969	PFLP hijacked TWA plane; Israeli passengers detained in Damascus
27 November 1969	PFLP terrorists bombed El Al office in Athens; killed one and wounded 13 others
21 February 1970	PFLP sabotaged Swissair plane en route to Tel Aviv crashed on take-off killing all 47 passengers, including 15 Israelis
21 February 1970	PFLP bomb exploded in Austrian plane carrying mail to Tel Aviv; no casualties
8 June 1970	Morris Draper, US diplomat kidnapped by PFLP in Amman, Jordan
10 June 1970	Major Robert Perry, US Military Officer, assassinated by PFLP in Amman, Jordan
6 September 1970	PFLP hijacked a Pan Am 747, a TWA 707 and a Swissair DC-8. The 747 was blown up in Cairo, the 707 and DC-8 were blown up in Jordan
28 November 1971	Black September Organization (BSO) members assassinated Jordanian Prime Minister Wasfi Tal in Cairo
8 May 1972	BSO hijacked Sabena plane to Lod Airport, Israel. Israeli security forces killed 3 hijackers; passengers freed.
30 May 1972	Japanese terrorists from Red Army Faction, collaborating with PFLP, attacked passengers at Lod Airport; 28 killed, 78 wounded
5 September 1972	BSO terrorists killed 11 members of Israeli Olympic team at Munich
3 November 1972	A French girl, identified as a member of the PFLP, was killed in Amman, Jordan, while handling a bomb. Police reported she had intended to place the bomb in the US Embassy in Amman

³² “Late Note for the President’s Daily Brief of 18 February 1969,” CIA, 19 February, 1969, https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/DOC_0005976624.pdf

³³ “Chronologies of Significant Fedayeen and Non-Fedayeen Terrorist Incidents, 1 January 1968 – 15 October 1973,” CIA Memorandum, https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/DOC_0005764836.pdf

The September 1970 hijackings led to a hostage situation. The PFLP released most of the 310 hostages, but held on to a group of hostages—mostly Jews and Americans—even after it blew up the airplanes at Dawson’s Field in Jordan. The President’s Daily Brief for 7 September 1970 makes clear the U.S. government was aware this act of terrorism was the work of the PFLP, adding that the group had “been involved in a number of similar incidents in the past.”³⁴ It continued: “The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), which has been involved in a number of similar incidents in the past, claimed responsibility for hijacking four aircraft yesterday en route from Europe to New York.”³⁵ One of these hijacking plots, involving famed PFLP hijacker Laila Khaled, was thwarted in London. When she was arrested in London, Khaled claimed, “I am the leader of the hijack. My name is Leila Khaled and [sic] a member of the PFLP and from the unit of Rasmieh Odeh, a Palestinian woman prisoner.”³⁶

As the hostage situation continued, the President’s Daily Brief for September 16, 1970, expressed the concern of U.S. and allied governments regarding the safety of the hostages held by the PFLP. With Jordan considering “moving toward a confrontation with the fedayeen [PFLP fighters],” the U.S. worried that “large-scale fighting between the army and the Fedayeen could bode ill for the future of the hostages still being held by the PFLP.” The PDB reported that Swiss diplomats feared the hostages “may be taken to particularly dangerous locations to forestall a military move against the [PFLP] commandos,” while British officials believed “the PFLP position is likely to toughen with the passage of time and that the PFLP may underscore its demands by hijacking another plan or killing the hostages one by one.”³⁷

In the case of the Munich Olympic attack (September 1972), it is worth reiterating that the BSO was comprised, in part, of PFLP operatives. The terrorists in that case killed two hostages and demanded the release of some 234 prisoners held in Israeli jails for the remaining hostages.³⁸

Over time, the PFLP would be involved in some of the most famous acts of terrorism around the world, sometimes in collaboration with other Marxist-Leninist groups like the Japanese Red Army Faction and German Baader-Meinhof Gang. For example, a State Department chronology of significant terrorist incidents includes the June 27, 1976, Entebbe Hostage Crisis in which “Members of the Baader-Meinhoff Group and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) seized an Air France airliner and its 258 passengers. They forced the plane to land in Uganda. On July 3 Israeli commandos successfully rescued the passengers.”³⁹

³⁴ “President’s Daily Brief 7 September 1970,” CIA, https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/DOC_0005977668.pdf

³⁵ “President’s Daily Brief 7 September 1970,” CIA, https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/DOC_0005977668.pdf

³⁶ “Heading to Haifa: Want to see my home up close? Who is Leila Khaled?” Adonis Diaries, August 3, 2011, <https://adonis49.wordpress.com/2011/08/03/heading-to-haifa-want-to-see-my-home-up-close-who-is-leila-khaled/>

³⁷ “The President’s Daily Brief 16 September 1970,” CIA, https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/DOC_0005977684.pdf

³⁸ Jennifer Latson, “‘Murder in Munich’: A Terrorist Threat Ignored,” *Time*, September 5, 2014, <http://time.com/3223225/munich-anniversary/>

³⁹ “Significant Terrorist Incidents, 1961-2003: A Brief Chronology,” Historical Background, Office of the Historian, Bureau of Public Affairs, U.S. Department of State, <https://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/ho/pubs/fs/5902.htm>

Over the decade spanning 1971-1981, a CIA report stated, the PFLP and several other of the larger Palestinian terrorist groups effectively became “patron state sponsors of international terrorism” themselves. The PFLP and other groups “have provided training, arms, and other logistical support to the entire spectrum of international terrorism,” including funneling along Soviet weapons and Syrian and Libyan state support to terrorist groups from Armenia, Germany, The Ireland, Japan, Netherlands, Spain, Turkey, as well as “most Latin American terrorist groups.”⁴⁰ In fact, according to Charles Allen, the CIA’s then-National Intelligence Officer for Counterterrorism, “the noted international terrorist Carlos [Ilich Ramírez Sánchez, aka Carlos the Jackal] is also a member of the PFLP.”⁴¹

The PFLP took no exception to targeting civilian targets, neither in Israel nor abroad. “For the PFLP anything linked to Israel was a target for attack, including hospitals and civilians sites,” notes one scholar.⁴² PFLP leaders justified spectacular attacks abroad by noting the publicity they brought the group and its cause. In the words of PFLP leader George Habash: “To kill a Jew far from the battlefield has more effect than killing 100 of them in battle; it attracts more attention. And when we set fire to a store in London those few flames are worth the burning down of two kibbutzim.”⁴³

To disrupt the peace process initiated by the 1993 Oslo Agreement and the Declaration of Principles, ten violent Palestinian groups banded together to form a rejectionist front against the peace process. The PFLP joined the Alliance of Palestinian Forces (APF) to oppose the Declaration of Principles signed by Israel and the PLO and suspended its membership in the PLO at that time. Spanning the spectrum of Palestinian terrorist groups – from the Marxist-oriented Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) to the Islamist Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad (which were already members of the National Islamic Front) – the collection of groups rejected negotiating peace with Israel and advocated continued terrorist attacks against Israel instead. Established in Damascus, the group was commonly referred to as the “Damascus Ten.” According to a statement released at the end of the three-day founding conference in Damascus in October 1993, the groups specifically formed their coalition “with the aim of scuppering the [Israeli-Palestinian peace] accord.”⁴⁴ Throughout the 1990s, the PFLP and other rejectionist groups maintained headquarters, propaganda offices and training camps abroad, and received safe haven, along with financial and logistical support from a variety of Middle Eastern governments. Most of these groups, including the PFLP, maintained their headquarters office in Damascus, Syria, which remains one of the primary reasons for Syria’s longstanding presence on the U.S. State Department’s list of state sponsors of terrorism.

⁴⁰ “State Support for International Terrorism, 1985,” Central Intelligence Agency, Directorate of Intelligence, May 1986, <https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP97R00694R00060010001-3.pdf>

⁴¹ Affidavit of Charles E. Allen, National Intelligence Officers for Counterterrorism, Central Intelligence Agency, In Matters of Khader Musa Hamid (A-19262560) and Michele Ibrahim Shehadeh (A-30660528), United States Immigration Court, Los Angeles, California, July 22, 1987,

<https://www.reaganlibrary.gov/sites/default/files/digitallibrary/smolf/counterterrorism/r7/terrorismgroups-pflp.pdf>

⁴² Daniel Byman, *A High Price: The Triumphs and Failures of Israeli Counterterrorism* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), p. 41

⁴³ Daniel Byman, *A High Price: The Triumphs and Failures of Israeli Counterterrorism* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), p. 45

⁴⁴ “Palestinian rejectionist groups vow to form national opposition movement,” AFP, October 9, 1993

In 1996, the PFLP and DFLP both dropped out of the APF and the two groups reportedly made limited though ultimately unsuccessful moves toward merging with the DFLP. In 1999, PFLP leaders met with Arafat's Fatah party and PLO representatives to discuss national unity and the possibility of the PFLP's reintegration into the PLO but it continued to oppose the then ongoing negotiations with Israel and remained committed to violence rather than negotiation as a means of dealing with the Arab-Israeli conflict.⁴⁵

In July 2000, Israeli and Palestinian leaders and negotiators met at the Camp David Presidential retreat in Maryland in an attempt to reach a final status peace agreement that would (1) establish an independent, sovereign Palestinian state in all of the Gaza Strip and at least 93% of the West Bank, and (2) provide for the security of Israeli citizens. The deal was to be final, putting to bed the decades-old conflict, including both sides' claims and counterclaims. Unfortunately, as subsequently documented by Ambassador Dennis Ross, who mediated Israeli-Palestinian negotiations under the first Bush and both Clinton administrations, Arafat missed a historic opportunity when he turned down the Clinton Proposal presented at Camp David. Negotiations resumed at the Egyptian resort of Taba in the Sinai shortly thereafter, but fell apart despite further progress on several key issues primarily due to the outbreak of violence in the West Bank and Gaza and the subsequent collapse of the government of Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak.

Following the outbreak of violence in September 2000, the Israeli-Palestinian arena was dominated by Palestinian street violence and organized terrorist attacks (many involving members of the Palestinian security services) on the one hand, and Israeli reprisal attacks and raids on Palestinian cities on the other. Then-PA Chairman Yasser Arafat initiated a policy of national unity within weeks of the al Aqsa Intifada's onset when he invited leaders of Hamas, Palestine Islamic Jihad (PIJ), the PFLP, and other groups to join his "emergency cabinet."

Habash stepped down as Secretary General of the PFLP in 2000 due to poor health and was succeeded by Abu Ali Mustafa (Mustafa Ali Kasam Zabiri) in May of that year. Prior to the start of the al Aqsa intifada in September 2000, the PFLP had been largely inactive for some time. Israel approved the return of eighteen Palestine National Council (PNC) members to Gaza on February 26, 1996, including five PFLP members formerly wanted as terrorists.⁴⁶ After three years of relative silence, the PFLP held reconciliation talks with the PA in August 1999 and was nearly dropped from U.S. government terrorist lists. But then the PFLP took responsibility for five car bombings, including four Jerusalem bombings within seven hours on September 3, 2001.⁴⁷

⁴⁵ U.S. State Department's 1999 Patterns of Global Terrorism,
<http://www.state.gov/www/global/terrorism/1999report/appb.html>

⁴⁶ "Israel Approves Return of another 18 PNC Members" (text), Jerusalem, Al-Quds in Arabic (February 26, 1996), 1, and "Israel Approves Return of Some PFLP Members," Voice of Palestine Radio in Arabic (1900 GMT, February 26, 1996), Translation by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. (GPO microfiches; FBIS-NES-96-039, February 27, 1996, p. 6)

⁴⁷ Etgar Lefkovits, "Four Bombings in 7 Hours Shake Jerusalem," *The Jerusalem Post*, September 4, 2001

In August 2001, Israeli forces killed Abu Ali Mustafa who was succeeded as by Ahmed Saadat as Secretary General in October 2001. Four PFLP terrorists carried out the October 17, 2001, assassination of Israeli tourism minister Rehavam Ze'evi; their presence in Yasir Arafat's Ramallah compound was at the center of the dispute during the Israeli encirclement of the compound. In a marked shift, the secular and Marxist PFLP also ventured into the traditional territory of radical Islamist extremists by carrying out suicide bombings. These include the February 16, 2002, suicide attack in Karnei Shomron,⁴⁸ a suicide bombing in Ariel that injured 10 (including an American Christian pilgrim),⁴⁹ and another in Netanya on May 19, 2002, killing three and wounding over fifty civilians.⁵⁰ The Netanya attack was ordered by PFLP head Ahmed Sa'adat from his prison cell in Jericho⁵¹ (Sa'adat's cellphone was reportedly taken away after Israeli authorities demonstrated he was still running PFLP terrorist activity from his cell, but was returned to him by August 2002).⁵² On April 26, 2002, Israeli forces raided Qalqilya, foiling a PFLP plot to bomb Tel Aviv's twin Azrieli Towers with an unusually powerful car bomb filled with more than a half ton of explosives.⁵³ On May 1, 2002, the PFLP detonated a bomb in the garden of the British Council in Gaza City, in retaliation for Britain's participation in the detention of five PFLP terrorists (and a PA official) a few hours earlier.⁵⁴ In its 2001 terrorism report, the State Department noted that, "In recognition of the PFLP's growing role, an Iraqi Vice President met with former PFLP Secretary General Habash in Baghdad in January 2001 and expressed continued Iraqi support for the Intifadah. Also, in mid-September, a senior delegation from the PFLP met with an Iraqi Deputy Prime Minister."⁵⁵

(A more complete list of PFLP attacks is included below).

In August 2001, Israeli forces fired a rocket into the West Bank office of PFLP leader Abu Ali Mustafa. As noted, leadership of the PFLP then passed to Ahmed Saadat, who was arrested by the Palestinian Authority in January 2002 under pressure from Israel for his role in the assassination of Israeli Tourism Minister Rehavam Ze'evi by PFLP gunmen in October 2001. For a period of time Saadat and other PFLP terrorists involved in the Ze'evi assassination were held in a Jericho jail under the watch of British and American jailers. In March 2006, Israeli forces arrested Saadat and transferred him to an Israeli prison.

⁴⁸ James Bennet, "West Bank Suicide Bombing Kills 2 Israelis and Hurts 30, *The New York Times*, February 17, 2002

⁴⁹ Haim Shadmi, Nadav Shragai, and Johnathan Lis, "Suicide Bomber Injures 10 in Ariel; Another Stopped in Jerusalem," *Ha'aretz* (Tel Aviv), March 7, 2002

⁵⁰ Israel Television Channel Two, May 19, 2002, cited in Aaron Lerner, "Ahmad Sa'adat Ordered Netanya Attack from his Jericho Office," Independent Media Review and Analysis, May 19, 2002, at www.imra.org.il

⁵¹ Israel Television Channel Two, May 19, 2002, cited in Aaron Lerner, "Ahmad Sa'adat Ordered Netanya Attack from his Jericho Office," Independent Media Review and Analysis, May 19, 2002, at www.imra.org.il

⁵² Khaled Abu Toameh, "Terrorist in Jericho Prison Given Cellphone Access," *The Jerusalem Post*, August 22, 2002

⁵³ Paul Martin, "Israelis Foiled Bombing of Tallest Edifice," *The Washington Times*, May 5, 2002

⁵⁴ Sam Kiley, "Released from Siege, Arafat Attacks 'Bethlehem Atrocities,'" *The Evening Standard* (London), May 2, 2002; Yoav Appel, "Palestinian Shot by Troops at Church of the Nativity; Sharon prepares for US Visit," *Associated Press*, May 4, 2002.

⁵⁵ U.S. State Department, *Patterns of Global Terrorism 2001*, published May 2002, <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/10319.pdf>

Since 2001, the PFLP drastically increased its terrorist activity, including shooting attacks, assassinating an Israeli minister, and executing suicide bombings targeting civilians. In 2006, three PFLP members were elected to the Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC) under the “Martyr Abu Ali Mustafa List,” including PFLP leader Ahmed Sa’adat, Jamil Majdalawi, and Khaleda Kanan Jarrar.⁵⁶

C. PFLP Goals and Means of Achieving Them

The PFLP claims to have accepted the principle of a two-state solution, but the group opposes specific provisions of the various peace initiatives and remains committed to carrying out acts of political violence and terrorism targeting Israel and its civilian population.⁵⁷ In the words of PFLP founder George Habash, “We will continue struggling to change the political course and steer it in the direction of a patriotic stance which is firm in its hostility to the Zionist entity and imperialism The rifle has paved the way for the stone. We can never look upon the stone as an alternative to the rifle. In the same way the rifle has paved the way for the stone, the stone is supposed to pave the way for a new wave of escalated armed struggle.”⁵⁸

At least some PFLP leaders, however, advocate self-determination in the near term but in the long term call not for a two-state solution but for a single, bi-national state that would replace the Jewish state of Israel. In the words of Jamil Majdalawi, a member of the PFLP politburo:

The immediate goal of the PFLP is the realization of the project of national liberation. The goals of this project are: self-determination, a state with Jerusalem as the capital, and the right-to-return for refugees. The strategic, long-term goals with respect to Palestine concern the creation of a just and peaceful region as a whole. Such a solution can only be realized through the creation of a democratic, secular state which can be home to all the peoples of the region, irrespective of their skin color, religion, or ethnicity. Such a solution would spare the region from the suffering which has been unleashed by the racist ideology of Zionism. This solution would also be an alternative to the creation of two religious states, a Jewish religious state and a religious Palestinian state.⁵⁹

Still committed to its leftist ideology, the PFLP focuses on uniting Palestinian factions around an agenda that remains committed to violent resistance to Israel, release of Palestinian prisoners (including the many PFLP terrorists currently in jail), Palestinian refugee’s “right of return,” and the Jerusalem issue. The PFLP’s 1969 platform confirms the group’s adherence to Marxist principles, asserting that “Conventional War Is the War of the Bourgeoisie; Revolutionary War Is People’s War,” that “Guerrilla Struggle as a Form of Pressure for the “Peaceful Solution,”

⁵⁶ The Palestinian Legislative Council: A Handbook, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, <http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/templateC11.php?CID=385>

⁵⁷ U.S. State Department 2007 Country Reports on Terrorism, published April 2008, <http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/crt/2007/103714.htm>

⁵⁸ Quoted in Neil C. Livingstone and David Halevy, *Inside the PLO*, (New York: William Morrow and Co, 1990). p.211

⁵⁹ Interview with Jamil Majdalawi, PFLP Politburo member, Via NY Transfer News, January 2001, http://www.blythe.org/nytransfer-subs/2001mid/Interview_with_Jamil_Majdalawi,_PFLP

that “The War of Liberation Is a Class War Guided by a Revolutionary Ideology,” and that “The Main Field of Our Revolution Struggle is Palestine.”⁶⁰

In the wake of the U.S.-sponsored Annapolis peace conference in 2007, the PFLP issued a statement describing the peace conference as “an attempt to destroy the Palestinian cause” and as part of an “American Zionist agenda of economic, security and cultural dominance in the Middle East.”⁶¹

The PFLP is indeed focused on the Palestinian cause, but it has targeted Western interests in the region as well. On May 1, 2002, the PFLP detonated a bomb in the garden of the British Council in Gaza City, hours after the transfer of five PFLP terrorists and a PA official to a jail in Jericho (where American and British civilian observers were stationed to verify their continued detention). The bombing, which damaged the Council's door, was claimed by the PFLP in a statement denouncing Britain's role in the incarceration of its members.⁶² According to an account in the Palestinian daily al Hayat al Jadida on August 2, 2001, PFLP politburo member Maher Taher specifically called for attacks targeting America:

We Say to the Arab nation: Hit American interests and threaten them. United States is a fundamental enemy which takes part and holds responsibility to the elimination of the Palestinian people and the Palestinian villages. He asked the Arab countries to take a clear and strict position toward the USA, which is a fundamental enemy of the Palestinian people and the Arab nation.⁶³

The PFLP frequently cooperates with other groups to secure logistical and financial support and carry out attacks. The number of joint attacks the PFLP has executed in cooperation with other groups speaks for itself, as demonstrated in the list of attacks that follows below. But the PFLP's ties with other groups are extensive and longstanding. For example, in July of 1995, Hamas leader Mousa Abu Marzook and his family were held for questioning by U.S. immigration authorities when they attempted to reenter the United States after a visit to Jordan. Marzook attempted to conceal a small suitcase and an attaché case from inspectors; when discovered, these were found to include financial and personal records, as well as an address book. On his wife's person authorities found an address book with contact information for a variety of known terrorists

⁶⁰ Platform of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), <http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/Terrorism/pflpplat.html>

⁶¹ “PFLP: The movement is committed to its goals,” International Middle East Media Center, December 10, 2007, <http://www.imemc.org/article/51944.html>

⁶² Sam Kiley, “Released from Siege, Arafat Attacks ‘Bethlehem Atrocities’,” The Evening Standard (London), May 2, 2002, <http://www.standard.co.uk/news/arafat-attacks-bethlehem-atrocities-6328755.html>; Yoav Appel, “Palestinian Shot by Troops at Church of the Nativity; Sharon prepares for US Visit,” Associated Press (May 4, 2002), http://www2.ljworld.com/news/2002/may/04/palestinian_shot_by/

⁶³ “Palestinians Target America,” Palestinian Media Watch, September 11, 2001, <http://pmw.org.il/terror-110901-2.html>

and radicals, including George Habash, head of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP).⁶⁴

Nor are such connections a thing of the past. Consider the case of, Nahed Rashid Ahmed Attalah, an UNRWA employee in Gaza who used United Nations vehicles and his U.N. free travel permit (*laissez-passer*) to aid the terrorist activities of the Popular Resistance Committees (PRC) in Gaza, a motley crew of radicals from a variety of groups, including Hamas. Indicted in September 2002, Attalah admitted to using his U.N. vehicle on multiple occasions that summer to transport arms, explosives, and armed PRC activists to carry out terrorist attacks. Attalah also confessed to using his U.N. laissez-passer to travel to Egypt, Lebanon, and Syria, where he contacted members of the PFLP “in order to obtain money for transferring arms to the Gaza Strip as assistance for the PRC.”⁶⁵ In another instance, documents captured by Israeli forces in the West Bank during Operation Defensive Shield revealed that the Hamas-affiliated al-Tadhamun Charitable Society provided funds for the families of Palestinians “martyred” in suicide bombings or clashes with Israeli forces, including operatives from the PFLP.⁶⁶ In fact, in February 2006 Saadat affirmed that PFLP would welcome a political partnership with Hamas.⁶⁷

D. Current Status and Structure

As of June 2020, the U.S. State Department reported that the precise number of PFLP members was unknown – though in 2001 the Department stated it was believed to be “around 800” – operating in the West Bank, Gaza Strip, Israel, Syria and Lebanon.⁶⁸ A report published in January 2008 in *Jane's World Insurgency and Terrorism*, estimates that the PFLP still has some 800 members, “but the PFLP’s influence within the resistance movement is far greater than the number of its members.”⁶⁹ Moreover, the group historically only accepts members personally recruited by existing members. “Each cell,” Jane’s reports, “numbering between three and 10 members, is responsible for recruiting and training new members.”⁷⁰ According to

⁶⁴ Affidavit of Joseph Hummel (State of New York, County of New York, Southern District of New York), September 20, 1995, marked pages 0663-0675 of evidentiary material brought in *Stanley Boim et al. v. Quranic Literacy Institute et al.*, Civil No. 00 C 2905 (US District Court, Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division).

⁶⁵ C.S.S. Special Information Paper, *The terrorist organizations in and outside the PA areas exploit the status of UNRWA employees for facilitating terror activities: Nahed Rashid Ahmed Attalah, a senior UNRWA employee in the Gaza Strip--a case study*, March 2003, http://www.intelligence.org.il/eng/bu/unrwa_b/ter.htm

⁶⁶ C.S.S. Special Information Bulletin, “Appendix C: Transfer of funds from the Union of Good through Al Tadhamun to the Hamas-affiliated Tulkarm Charity Committee,” *The Union of Good: an umbrella organization comprised of more than 50 Islamic charitable funds and foundations worldwide. It in fact channels “charity” money and provides other items for Hamas-affiliated institutions in the Palestinian Authority-affiliated, contributing to sustaining the support-system infrastructure of Palestinian terrorism through the so-called financial jihad*, February 2005, http://www.intelligence.org.il/eng/sib/2_05/funds_c.htm

⁶⁷ The Palestinian Legislative Council: A Handbook, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, <http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/templateC11.php?CID=385>

⁶⁸ State Department Country Reports on Terrorism 2019, p. 289, <https://www.state.gov/reports/country-reports-on-terrorism-2019/>; State Department Patterns of Global Terrorism Report 2001, Appendix B p.104.

<http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/10300.pdf>; State Department Country Reports on Terrorism 2011, July 2012, <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/195768.pdf>

⁶⁹ “Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP),” *Jane's World Insurgency and Terrorism*, January 21, 2008, <http://www.janes.com/extracts/extract/jwit/jwit0134.html>

⁷⁰ “Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP),” *Jane's World Insurgency and Terrorism*, January 21, 2008, <http://www.janes.com/extracts/extract/jwit/jwit0134.html>

the Israeli foreign ministry, the PFLP's "operational center" in the West Bank is in Nablus, "where it is directed from the Gaza Strip."⁷¹ The PFLP is led by a Secretary General, currently Ahmed Saadat, who sits atop a politburo which functions as the group's governing body.⁷²

The PFLP remains the second largest non-Islamist Palestinian group after Fatah, though its relative influence in Palestinian politics has been significantly undermined by the dominance of Fatah, the rise of Islamist groups such as Hamas as the main opposition force in the Palestinian territories, the assassination of several PFLP leaders and the incarceration of the group's current leader, Ahmed Saadat. Still, the PFLP's assassination of an Israeli cabinet minister in 2001 increased the group's popularity, especially within the circles of Palestinian rejectionists. According to the U.S. State Department, the PFLP receives "safe haven and some logistical assistance" from Syria.⁷³

The PFLP is believed to have supporters abroad, including in Europe. For example, the PFLP's Leila Khaled -- charged in Britain for her role in the 1970 hijacking of an El Al airliner but released in exchange for a hostage before going to trial -- traveled to London in May 2002, where she openly gave public lectures and media interviews despite the criminal charges still pending against her in British courts. On May 22, 2002, Khaled told an audience at the School for Oriental and African Studies at the London School of Economics that "there are no suicide bombers, they are all freedom fighters."⁷⁴ She also taunted British authorities in public interviews, saying "if they are prepared to arrest me, I am prepared. My people can answer. We have a lot of supporters here."⁷⁵

While the PFLP has a military wing, Human Rights Watch (HRW) has noted that unlike other groups "the PFLP has not claimed any separation between its military wing and its political leaders." As a result, HRW concluded that the persons who carry out suicide and other attacks are criminally responsible for them but "PFLP leaders are also liable both directly and under the doctrine of command responsibility."⁷⁶ Indeed, PFLP leader Ahmed Saadat was directly involved in terror attacks, including the assassination of Israeli Tourism Minister Zeevi.

E. Designations

In 1995, the U.S. Treasury Department designated the PFLP and its leader George Habash on its list of Specially Designated Terrorists under Executive Order 12947 "Prohibiting Transactions with Terrorists Who Threaten to Disrupt the Middle East Peace Process." In 1997,

⁷¹ "The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) in 2006-2007," June 5, 2008, Israeli Foreign Ministry, [http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Terrorism-+Obstacle+to+Peace/Terror+Groups/The+Popular+Front+for+the+Liberation+of+Palestine+\(PFLP\)+2006-2007.htm](http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Terrorism-+Obstacle+to+Peace/Terror+Groups/The+Popular+Front+for+the+Liberation+of+Palestine+(PFLP)+2006-2007.htm)

⁷² Yonah Alexander, *Middle East Terrorism: Selected Group Profiles*, JINSA, 1994, Pp. 82-89

⁷³ U.S. State Department Country Reports on Terrorism, Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, April 30, 2007, Chapter 6 – Terrorist Organizations, available at <http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2006/82738.htm>

⁷⁴ Jessica Berry, "Fury Over Hijacker's Visit to Britain," *Daily Telegraph*, May 27, 2002, <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/1395466/Fury-over-hijackers-visit-to-Britain.html>

⁷⁵ Jessica Berry, "Fury Over Hijacker's Visit to Britain," *Daily Telegraph*, May 27, 2002, <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/1395466/Fury-over-hijackers-visit-to-Britain.html>

⁷⁶ "Erased in a Moment: Suicide Bombing Attacks Against Israeli Civilians," Human Rights Watch, October 2002

the State Department designated the PFLP as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO). It remains on both those lists today.⁷⁷

The Canadian government also listed the PFLP as a terrorist organization in November 2003, and reviewed and upheld the designation in November 2012.⁷⁸

The European Union has also listed the PFLP as a terrorist organization in December 2005, a decision that was reaffirmed in December 2007.⁷⁹

These actions are publicized, are a matter of public record, and are covered extensively in the international media. There can be no doubt that that PLO and PA knew—or, at a minimum, should have known—that the PFLP was a designated terrorist group. Indeed, a May 2002 U.S. State Department report took the PA to task for recognizing distinct political and military wings within the PFLP and for condemning the EU decision to list the PFLP as a terrorist group.⁸⁰

It should not surprise that Israel has long considered the PFLP a terrorist organization. But the Palestinian Authority has also taken action against the PFLP. Following a series of Hamas suicide bus bombings in February and March 1996, Arafat claimed to have banned the PFLP’s Red Hawks [Eagles] along with several other paramilitary organizations. The order specified the PA took this action “out of its feeling of national responsibility toward the Palestinian people.”⁸¹ Five years later, in the wake of Minister Rehavam Ze’evi’s assassination by PFLP terrorists, the PA again claimed to have outlawed the military wings of Hamas, PIJ, and the PFLP. This pledge was reiterated in the December 3, 2001, declaration of a state of emergency, and was mentioned again in another Arafat speech on December 16, 2001.⁸² But these were not followed up with any practical implementation. While they demonstrate that the PA was fully aware of the PFLP’s terrorist activities, they also underscore the PA’s long history of briefly arresting and then releasing terrorist suspects; of promising to counter terrorism but then doing little or nothing on the ground.

⁷⁷ Available online at <http://www.treas.gov/offices/enforcement/ofac/sdn/sdnew95.txt>;
<http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/other/des/123085.htm>

⁷⁸ <http://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/prg/ns/le/cle-eng.aspx#PFLP>

⁷⁹ <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2012:165:0072:01:EN:HTML>

⁸⁰ Report Pursuant to Title VIII of Public Law 101-246, Foreign Relations Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1990-1991, As Amended (The PLO Commitments Compliance Act of 1989, PLOCRA, As Amended), Submitted July 2002

⁸¹ “PA Statement Bans Hamas, Jihad, DFLP, PFLP Paramilitaries,” Jerusalem JMCC Press Service (1355 GMT, March 3, 1996), Translation by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service (GPO microfiche: FBIS-NES-96-043; p. 9)

⁸² WAFA report by IMRA (Independent Media Review Analysis) translated from Arabic by Mideast Mirror, at www.imra.org.il

F. Sample PFLP Terrorist Attacks

1968

- July 22, 1968 – Rome, Italy. The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) carries out its first hijacking, diverting an El Al flight to Algiers. 32 Jewish passengers are held hostage for 5 weeks.⁸³
- December 26, 1968 – Athens, Greece. 1 individual is killed and another is wounded in a shooting attack on an El Al aircraft at the airport, carried out by PFLP.⁸⁴

1969

- February 18, 1969 – Zurich, Switzerland. PFLP operatives wound 5 passengers at the Zurich airport. Three operatives are wounded and captured, and one is killed.⁸⁵
- June 20, 1969 – Jerusalem, Israel. PFLP plants three bombs, killing one and wounding five others, including two Americans. The next day, PFLP claims credit for the attack.⁸⁶
- September 8, 1969 – Brussels, Belgium. Three PFLP terrorists throw a grenade into an El Al Airlines office, wounding two people. Two terrorists escape, and the other is arrested.⁸⁷
- September 8, 1969 – The Hague, Netherlands. One PFLP terrorist throws a grenade at the Israeli Embassy. He is arrested, and no casualties are sustained.⁸⁸
- September 8, 1969 – Bonn, Germany. Two PFLP terrorists throw a grenade at the Israeli Embassy. No casualties are sustained.⁸⁹

1970

- March 28-29, 1970 – Beirut, Lebanon. PFLP operatives bomb five U.S. facilities in Lebanon, including the U.S. embassy, heavily damaging the USIS Kennedy Center in Beirut. No casualties are sustained.⁹⁰

⁸³ “PFLP, DFLP, PFLP-GC, Palestinian leftists,” Council on Foreign Relations, October 31, 2005, <https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/pflp-dflp-pflp-gc-palestinian-leftists>.

⁸⁴ Stewart Bell, “After 26-year fight, Canada finally deports Palestinian terrorist convicted of attack on Israeli plane,” *National Post* (Toronto), May 13, 2013, <https://nationalpost.com/news/canada/after-26-year-fight-canada-finally-deports-palestinian-terrorist-convicted-of-attack-of-el-al-plane>.

⁸⁵ Imogen Foulkes, “Switzerland ‘made secret deal with PLO’ after bomb attacks,” *BBC News*, January 22, 2016, <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-35384354>.

⁸⁶ Affidavit of Charles E. Allen, National Intelligence Officers for Counterterrorism, Central Intelligence Agency, In Matters of Khader Musa Hamid (A-19262560) and Michele Ibrahim Shehadeh (A-30660528), United States Immigration Court, Los Angeles, California, July 22, 1987, <https://www.reaganlibrary.gov/sites/default/files/digitallibrary/smolof/counterterrorism/r7/terrorismgroups-pflp.pdf>.

⁸⁷ Michael Whine, “Terrorist Incidents against Jewish Communities and Israeli Citizens Abroad, 1968-2003,” IDC Herzeliya International Institute for Counter-Terrorism, December 20, 2003, <https://www.ict.org.il/Article/893/Terrorist-Incidents-against-Jewish-Communities-and-Israeli-Citizens-Abroad-1968-2003#gsc.tab=0>.

⁸⁸ Ibid.

⁸⁹ Ibid.

⁹⁰ Affidavit of Charles E. Allen, National Intelligence Officers for Counterterrorism, Central Intelligence Agency, In Matters of Khader Musa Hamid (A-19262560) and Michele Ibrahim Shehadeh (A-30660528), United States Immigration Court, Los Angeles, California, July 22, 1987, 6, <https://www.reaganlibrary.gov/sites/default/files/digitallibrary/smolof/counterterrorism/r7/terrorismgroups-pflp.pdf>.

- June 7, 1970 – Amman, Jordan. PFLP operatives kidnap U.S. diplomat Morris Draper, demanding the release of 40 prisoners held by the Jordanian government. They release Draper after the government refuses to cede to their demands.⁹¹
- June 10, 1970 – Amman, Jordan. PFLP terrorists assassinate Assistant US Army Attaché Major Robert Perry as they forcibly enter his home.⁹²
- September 6, 1970 – Zarwa, Jordan. PFLP hijacks three airliners holding over 400 passengers, directing them to Dawson's Field, a remote desert airstrip near Zarqa, Jordan. The hostages are released in exchange for terrorists held in Germany, Switzerland, and England. After the planes are emptied, the hijackers blow them up.⁹³

1972

- May 30, 1972 – Lod, Israel. 24 are killed and 78 others are wounded after PFLP and Japanese Red Army terrorists open fire in the passenger terminal of Lod's international airport.⁹⁴

1973

- July 20, 1973 – Amsterdam, The Netherlands. Four PFLP terrorists and a member of the Japanese Red Army hijack Japan Air Lines flight 404 en route to Tokyo from Amsterdam-Schiphol International Airport shortly after its departure, forcing the pilots to fly to Dubai and Damascus. They finally direct the plane to land at Benghazi Airport in Libya, where all 141 passengers and crew were released, four are arrested, and one PFLP terrorist is killed.⁹⁵

1974

- April 11, 1974 – Kiryat Shemona, Israel. 18 individuals, including eight children, are killed when PFLP terrorists detonate their explosives amidst a failed rescue attempt by Israeli authorities.⁹⁶

⁹¹ Affidavit of Charles E. Allen, National Intelligence Officers for Counterterrorism, Central Intelligence Agency, In Matters of Khader Musa Hamid (A-19262560) and Michele Ibrahim Shehadeh (A-30660528), United States Immigration Court, Los Angeles, California, July 22, 1987, 6,

<https://www.reaganlibrary.gov/sites/default/files/digitallibrary/smof/counterterrorism/r7/terrorismgroups-pflp.pdf>.

⁹² Affidavit of Charles E. Allen, National Intelligence Officers for Counterterrorism, Central Intelligence Agency, In Matters of Khader Musa Hamid (A-19262560) and Michele Ibrahim Shehadeh (A-30660528), United States Immigration Court, Los Angeles, California, July 22, 1987, 6,

<https://www.reaganlibrary.gov/sites/default/files/digitallibrary/smof/counterterrorism/r7/terrorismgroups-pflp.pdf>.

⁹³ “PFLP, DFLP, PFLP-GC, Palestinian leftists,” Council on Foreign Relations, October 31, 2005,

<https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/pflp-dflp-pflp-gc-palestinian-leftists>.

⁹⁴ Ibid; “In the Spotlight: Japanese Red Army (JRA),” Center for Defense Information, October 9, 2003, https://web.archive.org/web/20061124224746/http://www.cdi.org/program/document.cfm?documentid=1771&programID=39&from_page=.%2Ffriendlyversion%2Fprintversion.cfm&CFID=5968562&CFTOKEN=24431082.

⁹⁵ “The Skyjackers Strike Again,” *Time Magazine*, July 30, 1973,

<http://content.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,907619,00.html>; “In the Spotlight: Japanese Red Army (JRA),” Center for Defense Information, October 9, 2003, https://web.archive.org/web/20061124224746/http://www.cdi.org/program/document.cfm?documentid=1771&programID=39&from_page=.%2Ffriendlyversion%2Fprintversion.cfm&CFID=5968562&CFTOKEN=24431082.

⁹⁶ “Massacre of 18 in Kiryat Shemona Continues to Provoke Indignation,” *JTA News Bulletin*, April 18, 1974, http://pdfs.jta.org/1974/1974-04-18_075.pdf?_ga=2.58189998.566645618.1555095630-681248010.1551282934.

- May 15, 1974 – Maalot, Israel. 27 individuals are killed, including 21 children, and another 78 are wounded by PFLP terrorists in a school, after an unsuccessful rescue attempt by Israeli authorities.⁹⁷

1976

- June 16, 1976 – Beirut, Lebanon. PFLP terrorists kidnap and assassinate U.S. Ambassador to Lebanon Francis E. Meloy Jr., economic counselor Robert O. Waring, and the ambassador's driver/bodyguard. They are found dead with gunshot wounds to the head in a garbage dump near a Beirut beach.⁹⁸
- June 27, 1976 – Entebbe, Uganda. An Air France airliner is hijacked by a joint German/PFLP terrorist group, which diverts the flight to Entebbe airport. About 258 passengers and crew are held hostage until all non-Israeli passengers are released. On July 4, 1976, Israeli commandos fly to Uganda and rescue the remaining hostages. All the terrorists are killed, as well as three passengers and operation leader Lieutenant-Colonel Yonatan Netanyahu.⁹⁹
- August 11, 1976 – Istanbul, Turkey. PFLP and Japanese Red Army terrorists kill four individuals, including one U.S. citizen, and wound 17 others boarding an El Al flight from an Istanbul airport to Israel.¹⁰⁰

1977

- October 13, 1973 – Mogadishu, Somalia. With the help of German terrorists, PFLP operatives hijack Lufthansa Flight 181 en route from Palma to Frankfurt, carrying 82 passengers, most of whom are West German citizens. They divert the plane to Rome, Larnaca, Bahrain, Dubai, Cologne, and then Yemen, where they murder the captain before continuing to Mogadishu. Four days later, West German commandos launch an operation, killing three of the terrorists and arresting a fourth.¹⁰¹

1979

- April 16, 1979 – Brussels, Belgium. PFLP terrorists launch a failed attempt to hijack an El Al plane at Zaventem airport. After the terrorists are prevented from approaching an arriving plane, they change approaches, and throw grenades and a gasoline bomb in a crowded arrival area, wounding five Belgians. They then enter an airport restaurant,

⁹⁷ Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “1967-1993: Major Terror Attacks”.

<https://mfa.gov.il/mfa/aboutisrael/maps/pages/1967-1993-%20major%20terror%20attacks.aspx>.

⁹⁸ Affidavit of Charles E. Allen, National Intelligence Officers for Counterterrorism, Central Intelligence Agency, In Matters of Khader Musa Hamid (A-19262560) and Michele Ibrahim Shehadeh (A-30660528), United States Immigration Court, Los Angeles, California, July 22, 1987, 6-7,

<https://www.reaganlibrary.gov/sites/default/files/digitallibrary/smotf/counterterrorism/r7/terrorismgroups-pflp.pdf>.

⁹⁹ “PFLP, DFLP, PFLP-GC, Palestinian leftists,” Council on Foreign Relations, October 31, 2005,

<https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/pflp-dflp-pflp-gc-palestinian-leftists>.

¹⁰⁰ Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “1967-1993: Major Terror Attacks”; Affidavit of Charles E. Allen, National Intelligence Officers for Counterterrorism, Central Intelligence Agency, In Matters of Khader Musa Hamid (A-19262560) and Michele Ibrahim Shehadeh (A-30660528), United States Immigration Court, Los Angeles, California, July 22, 1987, 7,

<https://www.reaganlibrary.gov/sites/default/files/digitallibrary/smotf/counterterrorism/r7/terrorismgroups-pflp.pdf>.

¹⁰¹ “4 Days of Fear, Then 7 Minutes For the Rescue,” *New York Times*, October 19, 1977,

<https://www.nytimes.com/1977/10/19/archives/4-days-of-fear-then-7-minutes-for-the-rescue-thursday-oct-13.html>.

shooting and wounding seven more. Two attackers are captured by authorities in the restaurant.¹⁰²

1984

- April 1, 1984 – Galilee, Israel. PFLP fires two rockets from Lebanon towards an Israeli civilian community in the Galilee.¹⁰³
- April 12, 1984 – Ashkelon, Israel. PFLP hijackers carrying grenades and Molotov cocktails board an intercity bus en route from Tel Aviv to Ashkelon with 41 passengers on board, forcing the bus to redirect towards the Egyptian border. They kill one Israeli passenger and injure eight others, before Israeli soldiers storm the bus, freeing the hostages.¹⁰⁴

1985

- May 6, 1985 – West Bank, Israel. PFLP remotely detonates a pipe bomb targeting an Israeli bus in the West Bank. No casualties are sustained.¹⁰⁵

1986

- January 12, 1986 – Galilee, Israel. PFLP claims responsibility for the murder of an Israeli policeman in the Galilee.¹⁰⁶
- March 2, 1986 – Nablus, West Bank, Israel. PLFP murders Palestinian mayor Zafer al-Masri in Nablus, claiming he was killed for cooperating with the “Zionist-Jordanian plan aimed at liquidating the Palestinian cause.”¹⁰⁷
- July 10, 1986 – Northern Coast, Israel. A joint PFLP-Syrian Social Nationalist Party (SSNP) squad attempts a raid, probably on an Israeli sea resort town of Nahariya, from sea by rubber dinghy. The attack is foiled by the Israel Defense Forces; all four terrorists are killed, in addition to two Israeli soldiers. Nine other soldiers are injured. Large

¹⁰² George H.W. Bush, *Terrorist Group Profiles*, (Washington, Vice President’s Task Force on Combating Terrorism, 1988), 25, <https://www.hsl.org/?view&did=716885>

¹⁰³ Affidavit of Charles E. Allen, National Intelligence Officers for Counterterrorism, Central Intelligence Agency, In Matters of Khader Musa Hamid (A-19262560) and Michele Ibrahim Shehadeh (A-30660528), United States Immigration Court, Los Angeles, California, July 22, 1987, 7,

<https://www.reaganlibrary.gov/sites/default/files/digitallibrary/smotf/counterterrorism/r7/terrorismgroups-pflp.pdf>.

¹⁰⁴ George H.W. Bush, *Terrorist Group Profiles*, (Washington, Vice President’s Task Force on Combating Terrorism, 1988), 26, <https://www.hsl.org/?view&did=716885>; Affidavit of Charles E. Allen, National Intelligence Officers for Counterterrorism, Central Intelligence Agency, In Matters of Khader Musa Hamid (A-19262560) and Michele Ibrahim Shehadeh (A-30660528), United States Immigration Court, Los Angeles, California, July 22, 1987, 7, <https://www.reaganlibrary.gov/sites/default/files/digitallibrary/smotf/counterterrorism/r7/terrorismgroups-pflp.pdf>.

¹⁰⁵ Affidavit of Charles E. Allen, National Intelligence Officers for Counterterrorism, Central Intelligence Agency, In Matters of Khader Musa Hamid (A-19262560) and Michele Ibrahim Shehadeh (A-30660528), United States Immigration Court, Los Angeles, California, July 22, 1987, 7-8,

<https://www.reaganlibrary.gov/sites/default/files/digitallibrary/smotf/counterterrorism/r7/terrorismgroups-pflp.pdf>.

¹⁰⁶ Affidavit of Charles E. Allen, National Intelligence Officers for Counterterrorism, Central Intelligence Agency, In Matters of Khader Musa Hamid (A-19262560) and Michele Ibrahim Shehadeh (A-30660528), United States Immigration Court, Los Angeles, California, July 22, 1987, 8,

<https://www.reaganlibrary.gov/sites/default/files/digitallibrary/smotf/counterterrorism/r7/terrorismgroups-pflp.pdf>.

¹⁰⁷ Affidavit of Charles E. Allen, National Intelligence Officers for Counterterrorism, Central Intelligence Agency, In Matters of Khader Musa Hamid (A-19262560) and Michele Ibrahim Shehadeh (A-30660528), United States Immigration Court, Los Angeles, California, July 22, 1987, 8,

<https://www.reaganlibrary.gov/sites/default/files/digitallibrary/smotf/counterterrorism/r7/terrorismgroups-pflp.pdf>.

quantities of weapons and sabotage materials reportedly related to the attack are also discovered at the alleged landing site.¹⁰⁸

- November 15, 1986 – Jerusalem, Israel. Three PFLP operatives stab an Israeli student in Jerusalem's Old City.¹⁰⁹

1987

- May 1987 – Metullah, Israel. PFLP claims responsibility for a rocket attack on Metullah, Israel.¹¹⁰

1990

- August 1990 – Nablus, West Bank, Israel. The Red Eagles, an armed group associated with PFLP, kills a Palestinian lawyer in Nablus for alleged collaboration with Israeli authorities.¹¹¹
- November 1990 – Southern Lebanon. PFLP operatives clash with the Israel Defense Forces in Southern Lebanon. 5 Israeli soldiers and 2 PFLP members are killed.¹¹²

1991

- February 1991 – Jerusalem, Israel. A PFLP operative stabs and kills an Israeli student in Jerusalem.¹¹³
- March 26, 1991 – Dolev, West Bank. PFLP murders Yair Mendelson in a roadside shooting on his drive home to Dolev.¹¹⁴
- October 1991 – Nablus, Israel. PFLP kills two and wounds five others in an attack on a bus traveling from Nablus to Ramallah.¹¹⁵

¹⁰⁸ Affidavit of Charles E. Allen, National Intelligence Officers for Counterterrorism, Central Intelligence Agency, In Matters of Khader Musa Hamid (A-19262560) and Michele Ibrahim Shehadeh (A-30660528), United States Immigration Court, Los Angeles, California, July 22, 1987, 8,

<https://www.reaganlibrary.gov/sites/default/files/digitallibrary/smof/counterterrorism/r7/terrorismgroups-pflp.pdf>; Thomas L. Friedman, "Israel Intercepts Raiders at Sea; 6 Dead in Fight," *New York Times*, July 11, 1986, <https://www.nytimes.com/1986/07/11/world/israel-intercepts-raiders-at-sea-6-dead-in-fight.html>.

¹⁰⁹ Itamar Sharon, "Terrorist wanted by Israel murdered at Palestinian Embassy in Bulgaria," *Times of Israel*, February 26, 2016, <https://www.timesofisrael.com/terrorist-wanted-by-israel-killed-inside-palestinian-embassy-in-bulgaria/>; Affidavit of Charles E. Allen, National Intelligence Officers for Counterterrorism, Central Intelligence Agency, In Matters of Khader Musa Hamid (A-19262560) and Michele Ibrahim Shehadeh (A-30660528), United States Immigration Court, Los Angeles, California, July 22, 1987, 8,

<https://www.reaganlibrary.gov/sites/default/files/digitallibrary/smof/counterterrorism/r7/terrorismgroups-pflp.pdf>.

¹¹⁰ George H.W. Bush, *Terrorist Group Profiles*, (Washington, Vice President's Task Force on Combating Terrorism, 1988), 26, <https://www.hslb.org/?view&did=716885>.

¹¹¹ Yonah Alexander, *Middle East Terrorism: Selected Group Profiles*, (Washington, Jewish Institute for National Security Affairs, 1994), 87.

¹¹² Yonah Alexander, *Middle East Terrorism: Selected Group Profiles*, (Washington, Jewish Institute for National Security Affairs, 1994), 87.

¹¹³ Yonah Alexander, *Middle East Terrorism: Selected Group Profiles*, (Washington, Jewish Institute for National Security Affairs, 1994), 87.

¹¹⁴ "Palestine: Jewish Settlements Loom Ominously Over Peace Treaty," Inter-Press Service News Agency, December 24, 1994, <http://www.ipsnews.net/1994/12/palestine-jewish-settlements-loom-ominously-over-peace-treaty/>.

¹¹⁵ Yonah Alexander, *Middle East Terrorism: Selected Group Profiles*, (Washington, Jewish Institute for National Security Affairs, 1994), 87.

1993

- March 12, 1993 – Gaza Strip. The Red Eagles, an armed group associated with PFLP, kills Simcha Levy, an Israeli who shuttles Palestinian workers from the Gaza Strip to Israel proper, by hacking her to death with an axe.¹¹⁶
- October 9, 1993 – Wadi Kelt, Israel. PFLP claims responsibility for the murder of Israeli hikers Dror Forer and Aran Bachar in the Judean Desert.¹¹⁷
- October 12, 1993 – Southern Lebanon. Israeli forces kill three PFLP members attempting to infiltrate Israel's "security zone" in southern Lebanon.¹¹⁸
- December 31, 1993 – Ramle, West Bank. Two Israelis, Chaim Weizman and David Bizi, are found murdered in a Ramle apartment. The Red Eagles, an armed group associated with PFLP, claims responsibility for the attack by leaving a leaflet at the scene.¹¹⁹

1994

- January 8, 1994 – Gaza Strip. Two Palestinians die in shootout between PFLP and pro-Arafat forces in Gaza.¹²⁰
- January 12, 1994 – Rishon Le-Zion, Israel. Israeli Moshe Becker is murdered by three of his Palestinian employees in his orchard. PFLP claims responsibility for the murder.¹²¹
- March 23, 1994 – Jerusalem, Israel. PFLP murders an Israeli civilian near Jerusalem's Damascus Gate.¹²²
- July 17, 1994 – Rosh Hanikra, Israel. Soldiers on an Israel Defense Forces naval patrol boat shoot two PFLP frogmen dead and wound and capture a third off the Israeli coastal city of Rosh Hanikra.¹²³

1996

- December 11, 1996 – Ramallah, West Bank. PFLP claims responsibility for the shooting of an Israeli woman and her son on a highway near Ramallah.¹²⁴

2001

¹¹⁶ "2 More Deadly Attacks in Israel Prompt a Call to Carry Firearms," Jewish Telegraphic Agency, March 15, 1993, <https://www.jta.org/1993/03/15/archive/2-more-deadly-attacks-in-israel-prompt-a-call-to-carry-firearms>.

¹¹⁷ "Fatal Terrorist Attacks in Israel (Sept 1993-1999)," Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, September 24, 2000, <https://mfa.gov.il/mfa/foreignpolicy/terrorism/palestinian/pages/fatal%20terrorist%20attacks%20in%20israel%20since%20the%20dop%20-s.aspx>.

¹¹⁸ Yonah Alexander, *Middle East Terrorism: Selected Group Profiles*, (Washington, Jewish Institute for National Security Affairs, 1994), 88.

¹¹⁹ "Fatal Terrorist Attacks in Israel (Sept 1993-1999)," Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, September 24, 2000, <https://mfa.gov.il/mfa/foreignpolicy/terrorism/palestinian/pages/fatal%20terrorist%20attacks%20in%20israel%20since%20the%20dop%20-s.aspx>.

¹²⁰ "Chronology: 16 November 1993-15 February 1994," *Journal of Palestine Studies*, XXIII, no. 3 (Spring 1994), 162-182.

¹²¹ Yonah Alexander, *Middle East Terrorism: Selected Group Profiles*, (Washington, Jewish Institute for National Security Affairs, 1994), 88.

¹²² Ibid.

¹²³ Ibid.

¹²⁴ Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "TERRORIST ATTACK IN BEIT EL-SELECTED ARTICLES-12-Dec-96," Press Release, December 12, 1996, <https://mfa.gov.il/mfa/mfa-archive/1996/pages/terrorist%20attack%20in%20beit%20el%20-%20selected%20articles%20-.aspx>.

- February 8, 2001 – Jerusalem, Israel. A PFLP car-bomb explodes in Jerusalem, wounding five Israeli citizens.¹²⁵
- March 21, 2001 – Jerusalem, Israel. A PFLP car bomb is discovered and neutralized in the Mea Shearim neighborhood in Jerusalem. No casualties are sustained.¹²⁶
- April 23, 2001 – Or Yehuda, Israel. A PFLP car-bomb explodes, wounding four Israeli citizens.¹²⁷
- May 27, 2001 – Jerusalem, Israel. A PFLP car-bomb exploded in Jerusalem's Russian Compound.¹²⁸
- June 1, 2001 – Mevasseret Tzion , Israel. A PFLP bomb explodes in Mevasseret Tzion, a Jerusalem suburb.¹²⁹
- June 18, 2001 – Haifa, Israel. A PFLP motorcycle-bomb is discovered in Haifa.¹³⁰
- July 2, 2001 – Yehud, Israel. Two PFLP car-bombs explode in Yehud, wounding 11 Israeli citizens. The cars, belonging to Israelis, were broken into the previous night and bombs rigged to be detonated through the use of cellular phones planted in their trunks.¹³¹
- July 27, 2001 – Malcha, Israel. A PFLP bomb planted in a bus in the Malcha shopping mall is discovered during a security check in Jerusalem.¹³²
- August 22, 2001 – Jerusalem, Israel. A PFLP car-bomb explodes in Jerusalem.¹³³
- September 3, 2001 – Jerusalem, Israel. A PFLP car-bomb and three other bombs explode in Jerusalem, wounding nine Israeli citizens.¹³⁴
- October 17, 2001 – Jerusalem, Israel. Abu Ali Mustafa Brigades, PFLP's military wing, assassinates Israeli Tourism Minister Rehavam Ze'evi at the former Hyatt Hotel in Jerusalem.¹³⁵

2002

- February 16, 2002 – Karnei Shomron, West Bank. A pizza parlor in an open mall in the Karnei Shomron settlement is targeted by Sadek Abdel Hafez in a suicide bombing. The attack kills three teenagers and injures about 30 other individuals. PFLP claims responsibility for the attack.¹³⁶

¹²⁵ Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Background on the PFLP,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs Library, October 17, 2001,

https://web.archive.org/web/20041019055624/http://www.mfa.gov.il:80/MFA/MFAArchive/2000_2009/2001/10/Ba_ckground%20on%20the%20PFLP%20-%202017-Oct-2001.

¹²⁶ Ibid.

¹²⁷ Ibid.

¹²⁸ Ibid.

¹²⁹ Ibid.

¹³⁰ Ibid.

¹³¹ Ibid.

¹³² Ibid.

¹³³ Ibid.

¹³⁴ Ibid.

¹³⁵ Ibid; “Erased in a Moment: Suicide Bombing Attacks Against Israeli Civilians,” Human Rights Watch, October 2002, 88, <https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/ISRAELPA1002.pdf>.

¹³⁶ Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Background on the PFLP,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs Library, October 17, 2001,

https://web.archive.org/web/20041019055624/http://www.mfa.gov.il:80/MFA/MFAArchive/2000_2009/2001/10/Ba_ckground%20on%20the%20PFLP%20-%202017-Oct-2001; “Israel hits back in West Bank,” BBC News, February 17, 2002, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/1825285.stm.

- March 7, 2002 – Ariel, West Bank. PFLP claims responsibility for an attack on a hotel lobby in a commercial center on the outskirts of Ariel that injures 15 individuals.¹³⁷
- May 1, 2002 – Gaza City, Gaza Strip. PFLP detonates a bomb in the garden of the British Council in Gaza City, just hours after the transfer of five PFLP terrorists and a Palestinian Authority official to a Jericho jail.¹³⁸
- Spring 2002 – West Bank. PFLP firebomb the home of Arafat advisor and PA negotiator Mohammad Rashid.¹³⁹
- May 19, 2002 – Netanya, Israel. PFLP and Hamas claim responsibility for an attack that kills three and injures 59 others.¹⁴⁰

2003

- April 24, 2003 – Kfar Saba, Israel. A Palestinian suicide bomber detonates a bomb in a crowded train station, killing a security guard and injuring 13 others. PFLP and Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade claim joint responsibility for the attack.¹⁴¹
- December 25, 2003 – Geha Junction, Israel. A Palestinian suicide bomber detonates an explosive at the Geha Interchange bus stop on the outskirts of Tel Aviv, killing four and wounding over 20 others. The Abu Ali Mustafa Brigades, PFLP’s military wing, claims responsibility for the attack.¹⁴²

2004

- May 22, 2004 – Jordan Valley. A PFLP suicide bomber kills himself and wounds one Israeli soldier and several Palestinians when he detonates his explosive at the Bekaot checkpoint in the Jordan Valley.¹⁴³ PFLP claims responsibility for the attack.¹⁴⁴

¹³⁷ Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Suicide and Other Bombing Attacks in Israel Since the Declaration of Principles (Sept 1993),” 2016, <https://mfa.gov.il/mfa/foreignpolicy/terrorism/palestinian/pages/suicide%20and%20other%20bombing%20attacks%20in%20israel%20since.aspx>.

¹³⁸ Matthew Levitt, “Targeting Terror: U.S. Policy Toward Middle Eastern State Sponsors and Terrorist Organizations, Post-September 11,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, October 2002, 39-40, 123, <https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/uploads/Documents/pubs/TargetingTerror.pdf>.

¹³⁹ Ibid, 40.

¹⁴⁰ Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Suicide and Other Bombing Attacks in Israel Since the Declaration of Principles (Sept 1993),” 2016, <https://mfa.gov.il/mfa/foreignpolicy/terrorism/palestinian/pages/suicide%20and%20other%20bombing%20attacks%20in%20israel%20since.aspx>.

¹⁴¹ “Suicide bomber hits rush hour station,” *The Guardian*, April 24, 2003, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2003/apr/24/israel1>.

¹⁴² Avi Kahan, “Four Killed in Attack on Geha Junction,” *Ynet News*, December 26, 2003, <https://www.ynet.co.il/articles/0,7340,L-2848729.00.html>.

¹⁴³ Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Suicide and Other Bombing Attacks in Israel Since the Declaration of Principles (Sept 1993),” 2016, <https://mfa.gov.il/mfa/foreignpolicy/terrorism/palestinian/pages/suicide%20and%20other%20bombing%20attacks%20in%20israel%20since.aspx>.

¹⁴⁴ Efrat Weiss, “Terrorist Explodes Himself in a Checkpoint in the Jordan River, Soldier Lightly Wounded,” *Ynet News*, May 22, 2004, <https://www.ynet.co.il/articles/0,7340,L-2920363.00.html>.

- May 2004 – Rafah, Gaza. An Israeli operation—Operation Rainbow—targets Palestinian terrorist weapons smuggling by a variety of groups, including PFLP.¹⁴⁵ The operation results in the deaths of 40 armed terrorists, dismantling of three tunnels, and comprehensive arrests of wanted militants.¹⁴⁶ The operation—and the PFLP’s involvement in this weapons smuggling—are also publicized at the United Nations Security Council.¹⁴⁷
- November 1, 2004 – Tel Aviv, Israel. Amer al-Far, a Palestinian suicide bomber, detonates an explosive in Tel Aviv’s Carmel Market, killing three and injuring over 30 others. PFLP claims responsibility for the attack.¹⁴⁸

2005

- January 9, 2005 – Israeli authorities arrest PFLP operative Nadel Muhammad Yusuf Abu Alma. According to one of his co-conspirators, Alma and two other operatives, acting under the guidance of senior PFLP terrorist Bashar Latif Aref Hanani, planned to perpetrate a terrorist attack at the IDF Armored Corps Museum at Latrun, using two suicide terrorists and a car bomb.¹⁴⁹
- January 20, 2005 -- Israeli authorities arrest PFLP operative Ubay Fahmi Basil Aboudi. According to one of his co-conspirators, Aboudi and two other operatives, acting under the guidance of senior PFLP terrorist Bashar Latif Aref Hanani, planned to perpetrate a terrorist attack at the IDF Armored Corps Museum at Latrun, using two suicide terrorists and a car bomb.¹⁵⁰
- February 11, 2005 –Joint IDF-ISA operation leads to arrest of PFLP operative Yusuf George Daoud Kila. Kila admitted that he and two other operatives, acting under the guidance of senior PFLP terrorist Bashar Latif Aref Hanani, planned to perpetrate a terrorist attack at the IDF Armored Corps Museum at Latrun, using two suicide terrorists and a car bomb.¹⁵¹
- December 21, 2005—PFLP claims responsibility for kidnapping Dutch and Australian citizens, the principal and deputy of the American International School in Gaza.¹⁵²

¹⁴⁵ Israeli Defense Forces, “Weapon Smuggling Tunnels in Rafah-Operation Rainbow,” May 17, 2004, <http://mfa.gov.il/MFA/ForeignPolicy/Terrorism/Palestinian/Pages/Weapon%20Smuggling%20Tunnels%20in%20Rafah%20May%202004.aspx>.

¹⁴⁶ Israeli Defense Forces, “Weapon Smuggling Tunnels in Rafah-Operation Rainbow,” May 17, 2004, <http://mfa.gov.il/MFA/ForeignPolicy/Terrorism/Palestinian/Pages/Weapon%20Smuggling%20Tunnels%20in%20Rafah%20May%202004.aspx>.

¹⁴⁷ Dan Gillerman, “Statement by Israel Ambassador Gillerman to the UN Security Council,” Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, May 19, 2004, <http://mfa.gov.il/MFA/InternatOrgs/Speeches/Pages/Statement%20by%20Amb%20Gillerman%20to%20UN%20Security%20Council%2019-May-2004.aspx>.

¹⁴⁸ Avi Kahan, “Two Women and One Man Murdered in an Attack on Carmel Market, in Tel Aviv,” *Ynet News*, November 1, 2004, <https://www.ynet.co.il/articles/0,7340,L-2998015,00.html>.

¹⁴⁹ “Counter-Terrorism, January-March 2005,” Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, April 4, 2005, <https://mfa.gov.il/MFA/ForeignPolicy/Terrorism/Palestinian/Pages/Counter-terrorism%20Jan-Mar%202005.aspx>

¹⁵⁰ Ibid.

¹⁵¹ Ibid.

¹⁵² “PFLP Claims Responsibility for Kidnapping Two Foreigners in Gaza,” Xinhua News Agency, December 22, 2005, http://en.people.cn/200512/22/eng20051222_229885.html

2006

- March 14, 2006 – IDF captures Ahmad Sa'adat, PFLP general secretary, and Ahed Ghulmeh, head of the group's operations wing, before they are released from a PA prison. The two were responsible for the assassination of Israeli Minister of Tourism Rehavam Zeevi in 2001. The two are transferred to Israel to stand trial.¹⁵³
- October 2006 – Nablus, West Bank. Explosive devices and a car bomb are detonated next to IDF troops in the Nablus area. PFLP operative Ibrahim Sayid Ibrahim Salem later confesses to involvement in the attack.¹⁵⁴

2007

- September 2007 – Tel Aviv, Israel. PFLP attempts to carry out a suicide bombing attack in Tel Aviv. Israeli investigators who thwart the plot believed it was planned in conjunction with Hamas operative Nihad Shakirat, whom they kill in an operation on the Jewish holiday of Yom Kippur (Day of Atonement).¹⁵⁵
- September 18, 2007 – Nablus, West Bank. Staff Sergeant Ben-Zion Haneman is killed in a shooting attack on IDF soldiers in the Ein Beit Ilmeh refugee camp. Islamic Jihad and PFLP claim responsibility for the attack. PFLP operative Ibrahim Sayid Ibrahim Salem later confesses to involvement in the attack. Several additional senior wanted PFLP operatives also took part in the attack, including Jad Hamidan and Majdi Mabruk.¹⁵⁶
- June 2007 – Modi'in, Israel. A PFLP terrorist plot targeting a synagogue in Modi'in is thwarted. In interrogations, Ramzi Hassan Hassin Sharauna, the leader of the cell, explains that he planned to dispatch the bomber to a synagogue and to escape to Ramallah. The same PFLP cell also planned to abduct U.S. citizens in the West Bank to negotiate the release of the organization's secretary-general, Ahmed Sa'adat; to conduct a combined shooting and bombing attack at a bus station in Modi'in; and to shoot and stab soldiers in the Hebron area.¹⁵⁷

2008

¹⁵³ “The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP, 2006-2007,” Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, June 5, 2008,

[https://mfa.gov.il/mfa/foreignpolicy/terrorism/palestinian/pages/the%20popular%20front%20for%20the%20liberation%20of%20palestine%20\(pflp\)%202006-2007.aspx](https://mfa.gov.il/mfa/foreignpolicy/terrorism/palestinian/pages/the%20popular%20front%20for%20the%20liberation%20of%20palestine%20(pflp)%202006-2007.aspx)

¹⁵⁴ “Senior PFLP Operative Arrested in Nablus,” *Jerusalem Post*, March 25, 2008.

<https://www.jpost.com/Israel/Senior-PFLP-operative-arrested-in-Nablus>; Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “PFLP terrorist involved in death of IDF soldier arrested,” March 25, 2008,

<https://mfa.gov.il/mfa/foreignpolicy/terrorism/palestinian/pages/pflp%20terrorist%20involved%20in%20death%20of%20idf%20soldier%20arrested%2025-mar-2008.aspx>.

¹⁵⁵ “Senior PFLP Operative Arrested in Nablus,” *Jerusalem Post*, March 25, 2008.

<https://www.jpost.com/Israel/Senior-PFLP-operative-arrested-in-Nablus>.

¹⁵⁶ “Senior PFLP Operative Arrested in Nablus,” *Jerusalem Post*, March 25, 2008.

<https://www.jpost.com/Israel/Senior-PFLP-operative-arrested-in-Nablus>; Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “PFLP terrorist involved in death of IDF soldier arrested,” March 25, 2008,

<https://mfa.gov.il/mfa/foreignpolicy/terrorism/palestinian/pages/pflp%20terrorist%20involved%20in%20death%20of%20idf%20soldier%20arrested%2025-mar-2008.aspx>; Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Ben-Zion Haneman,” September 19, 2007, <https://mfa.gov.il/MFA/ForeignPolicy/Terrorism/Victims/Pages/Ben-Zion%20Haneman%202007.aspx>.

¹⁵⁷ Israeli Security Sources, “Arrest of PFLP terror cell planning synagogue bombing,” June 19, 2007,

<http://mfa.gov.il/MFA/ForeignPolicy/Terrorism/Palestinian/Pages/Arrest%20of%20PFLP%20terror%20cell%20planning%20synagogue%20bombing%202007-Jun-2007.aspx>.

- February 4, 2008 – Dimona, Israel. Two Palestinian attackers detonate explosives in a shopping mall, killing one and injuring nine others, in a joint operation by PFLP and Al Aqsa Martyrs Brigade, a Fatah-affiliated militia.¹⁵⁸
- July 10, 2008 – Jerusalem, Israel. Israeli authorities announce the arrest several weeks earlier of an eight-person group of PFLP operatives in Issawiya suspected of throwing Molotov cocktails at Israeli vehicles in the Jerusalem area. No injuries or damage were reported in any of the cases.¹⁵⁹

2009

- May 22, 2009 – Israel-Gaza border. Palestinian terrorists detonate a bomb near an IDF patrol jeep on the Gaza border near the Kerem Hashalom crossing. No casualties are sustained, but PFLP claims responsibility for the attack.¹⁶⁰
- September 9, 2009 – Israel-Gaza border. PFLP military wing claims responsibility for an anti-tank missile fired at Israeli forces near the Erez crossing. The incident is also claimed by the Popular Resistance Committees.¹⁶¹
- September 10, 2009 – Israel-Gaza border. PFLP’s military wing claims responsibility for a shooting targeting Israeli forces near the Karni crossing.¹⁶²
- October 2009 – Gaza. The Abu Ali Mustapha Brigades, PFLP’s military wing, exchanges fire with IDF in Gaza, injuring a soldier.¹⁶³
- October 2009 – Netiv HaAsara, Gaza. PFLP claims responsibility for a mortar attack on the Israeli military post of Netiv HaAsara in Gaza, though Israel denies the attack took place.¹⁶⁴
- December 2009 – Beit Hanoun, Gaza. The Abu Ali Mustafa Brigades, PFLP’s military wing, claims it fired a rocket-propelled grenade at Israeli forces in Gaza, resulting in an exchange of machinegun fire east of Beit Hanoun. A spokesperson for the Israeli army confirms clashes in central Gaza, but says he is unaware of the rocket-propelled grenade and machinegun exchange.¹⁶⁵

2010

¹⁵⁸ Isabel Kershner, “Suicide Attack in Israel Kills One,” *New York Times*, February 5, 2008, <https://www.nytimes.com/2008/02/05/world/worldspecial/05mideast.html>.

¹⁵⁹ Efrat Weiss, “East Jerusalem Cell Arrested for Throwing Molotov Cocktails,” *Ynet News*, July 10, 2008, <http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-3566690,00.html>.

¹⁶⁰ Amos Harel, Avi Issacharoff, Anshel Pfeffer, “Bomb Explodes Near IDF Patrol at Gaza Border,” *Haaretz*, May 22, 2009, <http://www.haaretz.com/news/bomb-explodes-near-idf-patrol-at-gaza-border-1.276543>.

¹⁶¹ “News of Terrorism and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict (September 8-15, 2009),” Meir Amit Terrorism Information Center, September 15, 2009, <http://www.terrorism-info.org.il/en/article/18218>.

¹⁶² Ibid.

¹⁶³ “PFLP fighters report mortar fire, gun battles,” *Ma'an News Agency*, October 18, 2009, <http://www.maannews.net/eng/ViewDetails.aspx?ID=232930>.

¹⁶⁴ “Gaza factions break calm, claim two attacks,” *Ma'an News Agency*, October 18, 2009, <http://www.maannews.net/eng/ViewDetails.aspx?ID=232866>.

¹⁶⁵ “PFLP wing: Fierce clashes near Beit Hanoun,” *Ma'an News Agency*, December 13, 2009, <http://www.maannews.net/eng/ViewDetails.aspx?ID=246105>.

- January 1, 2010 – Nitivot, Israel. PFLP's Abu Ali Mustafa Brigades claims it fired two rockets at Nitivot from Gaza.¹⁶⁶
- March 26, 2010 – Three mortar shells are fired, two of them at an IDF contingent. No casualties are sustained. Palestinian Islamic Jihad, the Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades and PFLP all claim responsibility for the attacks.¹⁶⁷
- July 2010 – Khan Younis, Gaza. PFLP's Jihad Jibril Brigades claims responsibility for launching four mortar shells at Israeli forces east of Khan Younis in the south of Gaza.¹⁶⁸

2011

- March 11, 2011 – Itamar, West Bank. PFLP terrorists Hakim Maazan Niyad Awad and Amjad Muhammad Fawzi Awad murder an entire family in their sleep, including children aged 11, 4 and 3 years old. The two perpetrators are later arrested, as are accomplices Salah Aladin Salim Awad, Hassan Salim Awad, Maazan Niyaz Awad, Jihad Abid, and Muhammad Said Awad.¹⁶⁹
- August 2011 – Ashkelon, Israel. Abu Ali Mustapha Brigades, PFLP's military wing, claims it fired two rockets at Ashkelon, as well as an additional rocket earlier in the day.¹⁷⁰
- October 2011 – Israel. PFLP claims responsibility for firing two rockets and two homemade projectiles into Israel after a ceasefire.¹⁷¹

2012

- January 8, 2012 – Israel-Gaza border. Three mortar shells are fired at an area near the security fence. No casualties are sustained. The military-terrorist wings of the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP) and PFLP separately claim responsibility for the mortar shell fire.¹⁷²
- May 2012 – Hizma, West Bank. Israeli forces expose a PFLP terrorist cell in Hizma, which was planning to abduct an Israeli soldier.¹⁷³

¹⁶⁶ "PFLP Militants Fire Two Rockets from Gaza at S. Israel," *Business Ghana*, January 2, 2010, <https://www.businessghana.com/site/news/sports/101817/PFLP-militants-fire-two-rockets-from-Gaza-at-southern-Israel>; "Rocket and Mortar Attacks Against Israel by Date (2009-2017)," Jewish Virtual Library, <https://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/palestinian-rocket-and-mortar-attacks-against-israel>.

¹⁶⁷ "Rocket and Mortar Attacks Against Israel by Date (2009-2017)," Jewish Virtual Library, <https://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/palestinian-rocket-and-mortar-attacks-against-israel>.

¹⁶⁸ "Jihad, PFLP claim mortar attack in Gaza," *Ma'an News Agency*, July 19, 2010, <http://www.maannews.net/eng/ViewDetails.aspx?ID=300630>.

¹⁶⁹ Israeli Defense Forces, "Two of the Fogel family murderers arrested," April 17, 2011, http://mfa.gov.il/MFA/ForeignPolicy/Terrorism/Palestinian/Pages/Two_Fogel_family_murderers_arrested_17-Apr-2011.aspx.

¹⁷⁰ "PFLP armed wing claims 2 Ashkelon rockets," *Ma'an News Agency*, August 27, 2011, <http://www.maannews.net/eng/ViewDetails.aspx?ID=416382>.

¹⁷¹ "PFLP armed wing claims rocket fire on Israel," *Ma'an News Agency*, October 30, 2011, <http://www.maannews.net/eng/ViewDetails.aspx?ID=433828>.

¹⁷² "Rocket and Mortar Attacks Against Israel by Date (2009-2017)," Jewish Virtual Library, <https://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/palestinian-rocket-and-mortar-attacks-against-israel>.

¹⁷³ "News of Terrorism and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict (July 11-17, 2012)," Meir Amit Terrorism Information Center, July 11, 2012, <http://www.terrorism-info.org.il/en/article/20369>.

- November 2012 – Gaza. PFLP claims responsibility for a Kornet anti-tank missile launched at an IDF patrol near the fence in the center of Gaza. The incident injured four IDF personnel.¹⁷⁴
- December 2012 – West Bank. Israeli forces expose a PFLP terror cell in the West Bank, led by Ashraf Abu Aram, which was planning to kidnap an Israeli with the goal of trading the hostage for jailed PFLP leader Ahmed Sa'adet. Shin Bet states that “[t]he uncovering [of the plot] illustrates the high motivation of terrorist organizations to carry out a kidnapping, with a special emphasis on the PFLP, whose members have been involved in a number of plots in the past year and who have tried to carry out kidnappings in the West Bank.”¹⁷⁵

2013

- May 2, 2013 – Wadi Qelt , West Bank. A member of a PFLP terrorist cell carries out a shooting attack on an Israeli vehicle in the West Bank near the Wadi Qelt canyon, on the main road from Jerusalem to the Dead Sea. The man and four other PFLP activists are arrested in June.¹⁷⁶

2014

- November 2014 – Jerusalem, Israel. Two PFLP terrorists carry out an attack against Israelis praying in the Har Nof synagogue Kehilat Bnei Torah. Five individuals are killed, including three American citizens.¹⁷⁷

2015

- May 2015 – Jerusalem, Israel. Israeli police arrest three suspected PFLP terrorists for plotting an attack in East Jerusalem.¹⁷⁸
- September 13, 2015 – Jerusalem, Israel. PFLP members carry out a stone-throwing attack, resulting in the death of an Israeli driver, Alexander Levlovitz, who is killed when he swerves into a pole to avoid the stones, while driving home from Rosh Hashanah.¹⁷⁹
- August 14, 2015 – Eli, West Bank. Two PFLP members, Majdi Galal Ezzat Kowarik and Ahmed Azam Ata Abda, carry out an arson attack on a gas station in the community of Eli, located in the West Bank; they also inscribe PFLP’s symbol on the station. The next

¹⁷⁴ “News of Terrorism and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict (November 7-13, 2012),” Meir Amit Terrorism Information Center, November 13, 2012, <http://www.terrorism-info.org.il/en/article/20423>.

¹⁷⁵ Yaakov Lappin, “Security forces uncover PFLP kidnapping plot,” *Jerusalem Post*, December 25, 2012, <http://www.jpost.com/Defense/Article.aspx?id=297262>.

¹⁷⁶ “Terror cell behind Wadi Qelt attack uncovered,” *Times of Israel*, June 27, 2013, <https://www.timesofisrael.com/terror-cell-behind-wadi-qelt-attack-uncovered/>; Gavriel Fiske, “Shots fired at Israeli car in West Bank,” *Times of Israel*, May 2, 2013, <https://www.timesofisrael.com/shots-fired-on-israeli-car-in-west-bank/>.

¹⁷⁷ Judy Rudoren and Isabel Kershner, “Israel Shaken by 5 Deaths in Synagogue Assault,” *New York Times*, November 18, 2014, <https://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/19/world/middleeast/killings-in-jerusalem-synagogue-complex.html>.

¹⁷⁸ U.S. State Department, *Country Reports on Terrorism 2015*, April, 2016, <https://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2015/257523.htm>.

¹⁷⁹ “Court cancels home demolitions over deadly September attack,” *Times of Israel*, April 3, 2016, <https://www.timesofisrael.com/court-cancels-home-demolitions-over-deadly-september-attack/>.

month, the IDF dismantles a PFLP terrorist cell, including the perpetrators, in Awarta, a town neighboring Nablus.¹⁸⁰

- December 2015 – Israel-Gaza border. PFLP claims responsibility for several rocket attacks along the Israel-Gaza border.¹⁸¹

2017

- June 2017 – Jerusalem, Israel. Three Palestinian terrorists attack Israeli police officers with automatic weapons and knives, killing one officer near the Damascus Gate of Jerusalem's Old City and injuring several bystanders. All the attackers are killed. PFLP and Hamas both claim responsibility for the attack.¹⁸²
- August 14, 2017 – Nablus, West Bank. Muhammad Abu Khdeir and two others, all PFLP members, are indicted for plotting a shooting attack on a road near Nablus. The terrorists had been planning the attack since March; they had allegedly purchased weapons, trained, and met with PFLP coordinators to pick an attack location.¹⁸³

2018

- May 2018 – Jerusalem, Israel. Israeli forces expose a network of three PFLP operatives, including Muhammad Jamal Rashdah. Directed by a PFLP operative in Syria, the cell was planning to assassinate Israeli political figures, such as Benjamin Netanyahu and then-Jerusalem-mayor Nir Barkat. They also planned to attack the American consulate in Jerusalem and a delegation of Canadians who were in Jerusalem to train PA security forces. The three are indicted on May 27, 2018.¹⁸⁴
- June 5, 2018 – Shin Bet arrests Muhammad Jamal Rasdah from the Shuafat refugee camp in east Jerusalem. Directed by a Syrian PFLP operative, Rasdah was gathering information about senior Israeli and international officials whom he intended to target.¹⁸⁵
- July 19, 2018 – Israel-Jordan border. Israeli security services arrest Belgian-Palestinian Mustafa Khaled Awad on suspicion of PFLP terrorist activity. Awad was attempting to cross the border into Israel. An investigation reveals that Awad had been active in the group since 2010 and was a member of a cell of PFLP terrorist operatives living and working in Europe, while in contact with terrorists from Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, and the

¹⁸⁰ “Tsahal démantèle une cellule terroriste,” *Times of Israel*, September 29, 2015.

<https://fr.timesofisrael.com/tsahal-demantele-une-cellule-terroriste/>.

¹⁸¹ U.S. State Department, *Country Reports on Terrorism 2015*, April, 2016,

<https://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2015/257523.htm>.

¹⁸² “PFLP, Hamas claim responsibility over deadly Jerusalem attack,” *Middle East Observer*, June 18, 2017,

<https://www.middleeastobserver.org/2017/06/18/37451/>.

¹⁸³ Yonah Jeremy Bob, “Muhammad Abu Khdeir indicted for PFLP shooting,” *Jerusalem Post*, August 15, 2020,

<https://www.jpost.com/israel-news/muhammad-abu-khdeir-indicted-for-pflp-shooting-502421>.

¹⁸⁴ “Palestinian Violence and Terrorism Against Israel, 2018: Data, Nature and Trends,” Meir Amit Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center, February 18, 2019, <https://www.terrorism-info.org.il/en/palestinian-violence-terrorism-israel-2018-data-nature-trends-2/>; Anna Ahronheim, “Shin Bet thwarts terror attack guided by operative in Syria,” *Jerusalem Post*, June 5, 2020, <https://www.jpost.com/arab-israeli-conflict/shin-bet-thwarts-terror-attack-guided-by-terror-operative-in-syria-559188>.

¹⁸⁵ Anna Ahronheim, “Shin Bet thwarts terror attack guided by operative in Syria,” *Jerusalem Post*, June 5, 2020,

<https://www.jpost.com/arab-israeli-conflict/shin-bet-thwarts-terror-attack-guided-by-terror-operative-in-syria-559188>

West Bank. He also helped transfer funds from the PFLP terrorist organization in Syria and Lebanon to European activists.¹⁸⁶

2019

- September 14, 2019 – Khan Younis, Gaza. PFLP claims credit for downing an “Israeli spy aircraft” near Khan Younis in southern Gaza. *Haaretz* later reports that the UAV belonged to the Islamic Jihad, not Israel.¹⁸⁷
- October 24, 2019 – Gaza. Hamas police units arrest Palestinian activists protesting on behalf of Gazan citizens, including PFLP affiliates.¹⁸⁸
- October 31, 2019 – Ramallah, West Bank. Israeli security services re-arrest PFLP operative Khalida Jarrar under suspicion for involvement in terrorist activity less than a year after her release from prison, where she was held under administrative detention from July 2017 to February 2019. She also was incarcerated in 2015 and 2016 after an Israeli military court convicted her of incitement to violence and “promoting terror activities.” Jarrar is a former PFLP lawmaker in the Palestinian Legislative Council, the Palestinian Authority parliament.¹⁸⁹
- December 18, 2019 – West Bank. Shin Bet announces the arrest of 50 PFLP members, including Samar Arbid, Yazan Magamas, and Qadam Shibil, for involvement in an attack on a West Bank tourist spot that killed 17-year-old Israeli Rina Shnerb. Through interrogations, Shin Bet discovers and confiscates “several deadly weapons belonging to the PFLP” including M16 and AK-47 semiautomatic rifles, Galil automatic rifles, Carbine rifles, Uzi submachine guns, pistols, silencers, and bomb-making materials.¹⁹⁰ They also arrest Khalida Jarrar, head of the group’s West Bank operations and vice chairman of BDS organization Addameer. A report from Israel’s Ministry of Strategic Affairs reveals that Addameer is a PFLP offshoot, with over half of its employees linked to PFLP.¹⁹¹

2020

- March 16, 2020 – Israel. Shin Bet arrests Israeli citizen Ayman Haj Yahya for spying for Iran. Yahya had been in contact with both Iranian intelligence officials and a PFLP operative in Lebanon named Khaled Yamani. Shin Bet stated that the investigation indicated “the depth

¹⁸⁶ Tamara Zieve, “Israel arrests Belgian national on suspicion of PFLP terror activity,” *Jerusalem Post*, August 15, 2018, <https://www.jpost.com/Arab-Israeli-Conflict/Israel-arrests-Belgian-national-on-suspicion-of-PFLP-terror-activity-564927>; Amira Hass, “Jailed Belgian-Palestinian returned to Israeli prison hours before flight home,” *Haaretz*, April 3, 2019 <https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/.premium-jailed-belgian-palestinian-returned-to-israeli-prison-hours-before-flight-home-1.6995582>.

¹⁸⁷ Gaza group claims it shot down IDF drone, but may have hit Islamic Jihad one,” *Times of Israel*, September 14, 2020 <https://www.timesofisrael.com/gaza-group-claims-it-shot-down-idf-drone-may-have-actually-hit-islamic-jihad/>.

¹⁸⁸ “Hamas arrests dozens of activists in bid to deter Gaza protests,” *YNet News*, October 24, 2019, <https://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0.7340.1.5612795.00.html>.

¹⁸⁹ Adam Rasgon, “Israeli forces re-arrest senior PFLP member in Ramallah,” *Times of Israel*, October 31, 2019, <https://www.timesofisrael.com/israeli-forces-re-arrest-senior-pflp-member-in-ramallah/>.

¹⁹⁰ Yoav Zaitun, “Shin Bet nabs 50-strong Palestinian terror cell, including killers of Israeli teen,” *YNet News*, December 18, 2020, <https://www.ynetnews.com/article/S1z2ytPRS>.

¹⁹¹ “‘Extensive overlaps’ between BDS and terror groups revealed,” *Jerusalem Post*, December 21, 2019, <https://www.jpost.com/Israel-News/Extensive-overlaps-between-BDS-and-terror-groups-revealed-611648>.

of ties between Iran and the PFLP and their efforts to carry out espionage and terrorist activities within Israel, even during the global fight against the coronavirus pandemic.”¹⁹²

- July 16, 2020 – West Bank. Shin Bet thwarts PFLP terrorist plots backed by Iran and Hezbollah, following the April arrest of Yazan Abu Salah. According to interrogations, PFLP planned to kidnap an IDF soldier to negotiate the release of Palestinian terrorists imprisoned in Israel. Salah had purchased weapons for the attacks, recruited help, and planned to receive military training in Lebanon.¹⁹³

G. Involvement of the Palestinian Authority (PA) in Acts of Terrorism

Over the course of the Second *Intifada*, some officials and agencies of the PA actively and passively supported terrorist activities. PA officials and agencies not only turned a blind eye to terrorist activity; they also funded, armed, and at times cooperated with, terrorist groups such as the Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades (AAMB), the PRC and others. Indeed, Mahmoud Zahar, one of Hamas’ leaders in Gaza, admitted on September 29, 2010, that PA “President [Yasir] Arafat instructed Hamas to carry out a number of military operations in the heart of the Jewish state after he felt that his negotiations [in 2000] with the Israeli government [led by Prime Minister Ehud Barak] then had failed.”¹⁹⁴

Some cases of PA involvement in terrorist activity involved senior PA officials. For example, there is evidence that Arafat approved funding for Palestinian terrorists, including a June 2002 payment of \$20,000 to the Al-Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades just as the group claimed responsibility for a suicide bombing in Jerusalem.¹⁹⁵ And, in November 2003, the *BBC* revealed that the PA was sending monthly payments of up to \$50,000 to AAMB members.¹⁹⁶ While paying lip service to the idea of condemning terrorist attacks – albeit not as acts of terror per se, but rather as harming the national interests of the PA – Arafat simultaneously personally authorized the financing of groups and individuals engaged in terror attacks against Israeli citizens.¹⁹⁷

The PA has openly run a “Fund for Families of Martyrs and the Injured,” which the World Bank reports has provided cash transfers to thousands of families of martyrs and those injured during the conflict with Israel. According to the World Bank, “the program is clearly not targeted to the poorest households. While some assistance should be directed to this population,

¹⁹² Yonah Jeremy Bob, “Israeli indicted for spying for Iran named as Ayman Haj Yahya,” *Jerusalem Post*, April 19, 2020, <https://www.jpost.com/arab-israeli-conflict/israeli-indicted-for-spying-for-iran-named-as-iman-haj-yahya-625138>.

¹⁹³ Judah Ari Gross, “Shin Bet: PFLP terror cells with ties to Iran, Hezbollah busted in West Bank,” *Times of Israel*, July 21, 2020, <https://www.timesofisrael.com/shin-bet-pflp-terror-cells-with-ties-to-iran-hezbollah-busted-in-west-bank/>.

¹⁹⁴ Khaled Abu Toameh, “Arafat ordered Hamas attacks against Israel in 2000,” *Jerusalem Post*, September 29, 2010.

¹⁹⁵ David E. Sanger, “Bush Says Palestinians Will Lose Aid if They Keep Arafat,” *The New York Times*, June 27, 2002, available at: <http://www.nytimes.com/2002/06/27/international/middleeast/27PREX.html?pagewanted=1> .

¹⁹⁶ BBCNews, “Palestinian Authority funds go to militants,” November 7, 2003. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/3243071.stm

¹⁹⁷ Center for Defense Information, “In the Spotlight: Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades,” June 10, 2002, available at: <http://www.cdi.org/terrorism/aqsa-pr.cfm>

the level of resources devoted to the Fund for Martyrs and the Injured does not seem justified from a welfare or fiscal perspective.”¹⁹⁸

The PA released key Hamas bomb makers and military commanders from PA prisons in 2000—part of a longstanding informal revolving prison door policy—and Hamas quickly became a principal actor in an umbrella organization of forces (including PIJ, the PFLP, and various elements of Arafat’s Fatah organization, such as the Tanzim and Force 17) under the banner of the National and Islamic Front. As early as October 2000, Mahmoud Zahar, a Hamas leader in Gaza, announced that Hamas and PIJ leaders were meeting with Fatah and PA officials “at least once daily.” Hamas then resumed conducting terrorist attacks independently as well as in joint operations with Fatah under the auspices of the PRC, the “Saladin Brigades,” and the “Return Brigades.”¹⁹⁹

In other cases, terrorism-related PA activities involved lower level officials. In January 2004, Ali Yusuf Jaara, a policeman from Bethlehem, carried out a suicide bombing on a bus in Jerusalem. AAMB and Hamas both claimed responsibility for the attack, which killed eleven people and injured over fifty.²⁰⁰ In addition, senior PA officials were involved in anti-Israeli terrorism, including suicide bombings targeting civilians in major Israeli population centers and terror attacks by Fatah groups such as AAMB, Force 17 and the Tanzim.

In addition to its intimate ties to Fatah, the dominant faction within the PLO, the Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades is also closely linked to the PA and the various Palestinian security forces. A revised version of the 2001 PLO Commitments Compliance Act (“PLOCCHA”) report released in July 2002, notes the role of Arafat aide and moneyman, and the moving force behind the *Karine-A* smuggling affair, Fuad Shubaki, in the attempt to smuggle “a large shipment of firearms, ammunition, rockets, and explosives into Gaza” Aboard the *Karine-A* weapons smuggling ship. The report adds: “Shubaki and other PA officials involved work very closely with PA Chairman Arafat, raising serious questions of his involvement and foreknowledge.”

Evidence from approximately 500,000 documents that Israel seized from PA offices in the course of *Operation Defensive Shield* in 2002 clearly indicates PA support for, and involvement in, terrorism. The seized documents include a letter dated September 16, 2001, from “Palestinian al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades” to Shubaki, requesting funds for electrical and chemical materials to manufacture explosives.²⁰¹

¹⁹⁸ “From Crisis to Greater Fiscal Independence,” West Bank and Gaza Public Expenditure Review, Volume 2, Middle East and North Africa Region Social and Economic Development Group, The World Bank, February 2007

¹⁹⁹ Keith Richburg, “Arafat Turns to Militants in Uprising: Freed Extremists Become Part of Palestine Resistance,” Washington Post, October 25, 2000; “Arafat Making Tactical Alliance with Islamic Jihad and Hamas,” International Herald Tribune, October 25, 2000; “Ghoushe: We Are Committed to Launching Martyrdom Operations—Coordination with Fatah Helped in Expanding Confrontations,” Al-Mostakbal (Lebanon), March 3, 2001.

²⁰⁰ Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Suicide Bombing of Egged Bus No. 19 in Jerusalem,” January 29, 2004, available at

http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/MFAArchive/2000_2009/2004/1/Suicide+bombing+of+Egged+bus+no+19+in+Jerusalem+-+.htm

²⁰¹ “The Involvement of Arafat, PA Senior Officials and Apparatuses in Terrorism against Israel and Corruption,” prepared by a team headed by Danny Naveh, Israeli Ministry of Parliamentary Affairs, May 2002.

The documents seized by Israel show that the PA facilitated the continuation of violence. One document shows that PA General Intelligence passed to its Ramallah office a list of 232 terrorists wanted by Israel, asking the office to “please inform the brothers whose names are mentioned above to take cautionary measures.” In at least two instances, PA security services knew of pending suicide attacks but took no action to prevent them or inform Israeli authorities.²⁰²

According to other PA General Intelligence (PAGI) documents seized by Israel, senior Palestinian security officers – including Jamal Switat, deputy head of PA Preventive Security in Jenin and an officer named Al Rah – “supplied PIJ and Hamas in the Jenin area with most of the weapons in their possession.” Switat also recruited a suicide bomber from within PAGI who carried out a November 2001 suicide bombing in Afula.²⁰³

Fatah bomb makers like Mutasen Hammad prepared explosives-laden suicide belts for both Al-Aqsa and PIJ.²⁰⁴ For instance, a joint PIJ-Fatah suicide attack at the old central bus station in Tel Aviv on January 25, 2002 wounded 23 people.²⁰⁵ Hammad, a local AAMB leader near Tulkarm, played a central role in the July 2001 bombing of a school bus near the West Bank village of Einav and had been a member of the joint Palestinian-Israeli security service in Jericho before being kicked out for his involvement in a shooting attack. He was killed in an IDF missile strike on Anabta, a village east of Tulkarm, while in a chicken coop that had been turned into a bomb factory.²⁰⁶ According to the PAGI documents seized by Israel, “the Islamic Jihad pays the expense of most of the activities that Fatah carries out. Additionally, the [Islamic] Jihad movement is adopting the killed Fatah activists.”²⁰⁷

The PA’s role in supporting terrorism is further highlighted by its direct funding of terrorism. Several documents seized in Operation Defensive Shield, many of which bear Arafat’s signature, grant funding requests for the families of suicide bombers and members of terrorist groups. A July 2001 letter from Kamal Hamid, Fatah’s Bethlehem secretary, to “The Honorable Brother President Arafat, May God protect you With the blessings of the homeland,” requests individual payments of \$2000 for 24 Fatah members. Arafat’s signature, dated August 12, 2001, authorizes the payment of “\$300 to each one” of the 24 individuals.²⁰⁸ Among those

²⁰² “The Involvement of Arafat, PA Senior Officials and Apparatuses in Terrorism against Israel and Corruption,” prepared by a team headed by Danny Naveh, Israeli Ministry of Parliamentary Affairs, May 2002.

²⁰³ “The Involvement of Arafat, PA Senior Officials and Apparatuses in Terrorism against Israel, Corruption and Crime,” Prepared by a team headed by Dani Naveh, Israel Ministry of Parliamentary Affairs, May 2002

²⁰⁴ Israel Defense Forces, “The Fatah and the PA Security Apparatuses in the Jenin Area”; Arie O’Sullivan, “Tanzim Bombmaker Killed by Missile,” Jerusalem Post, March 15, 2002.

²⁰⁵ Israel Defense Forces, “The Fatah and the PA Security Apparatuses in the Jenin Area Closely Cooperate with PIJ and Hamas,” April 9, 2002; “Suicide Bombing Terrorism During the Current Israeli-Palestinian Confrontation,” Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center, available at http://www.terrorism-info.org.il/malam_multimedia/English/eng_n/pdf/suicide_terrorism_ae.pdf

²⁰⁶ Arie O’Sullivan, “Tanzim Bombmaker Killed by Missile,” Jerusalem Post, March 15, 2002.

²⁰⁷ Israel Defense Forces, “The Fatah and the PA Security Apparatuses in the Jenin Area Closely Cooperate with PIJ and Hamas,” April 9, 2002; “Suicide Bombing Terrorism During the Current Israeli-Palestinian Confrontation,” Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center, available at http://www.terrorism-info.org.il/malam_multimedia/English/eng_n/pdf/suicide_terrorism_ae.pdf

²⁰⁸ “Appendix A: Translation of Captured Document,” “Palestinian Authority Captured Documents: Main Implications,” IDF/MI report, 7 April 2002, pg. 6-7.

allocated payment by Arafat was Atef Abiat, the former leader of a Bethlehem-based terror network and senior Fatah activist. Israeli intelligence documents indicate that Abiat's cell carried out several shootings and bombings in and around Jerusalem, and was responsible for the deaths of two Israeli soldiers and more than ten civilians.²⁰⁹

Another seized document from Hamid to Arafat, dated November 7, 2001, request[s] the decision of your honor regarding the urgent allocation of aid of a sum of [\$]3000 [to each] of the families of the brothers, the commanders, the martyrs, members of the movement who fell in the battle for the defense of Bet Jala, Bethlehem, Al Gaza and Ayida, and in order to pay some of their debts (bracketed information included in original Israeli translation).²¹⁰

Below a list of nine “martyrs” is a note in Arafat’s handwriting that “\$800 should be allocated to each one of them,” followed by the PA President’s signature. The letter itself is on Fatah, Bethlehem region, letterhead. Abiat is one of the nine listed.²¹¹

Included in an IDF report of the documents captured in *Defensive Shield* is a table summarizing the “Financing of Fatah/Tanzim and Al Aqsa Brigades Infrastructures and Activities by Arafat and his Aides.” The table lists seven distinct funding requests, five of which were approved by Arafat; Arafat’s senior aid and the PA’s General Security Apparatus financial head, Fuad Shubaki, oversaw the remaining two.²¹² In addition to the aforementioned requests is an “[a]llocation of urgent financial aid for 12 Fatah/Tanzim terror infrastructure activists in Tulkarm who were involved in lethal attacks.” Marwan Barghouti filed the request, which Arafat approved to the tune of \$350 per activist.²¹³

A November 17, 2001 letter to “Brothers, [the] Bethlehem Mayor and Honorable Municipality Members” from “The Palestinian National Liberation Movement, ‘Fatah,’ Al Aqsa Martyrs of the Nativity of the city of Bethlehem Brigades” bearing the AAMB insignia, further highlights Fatah’s and the PA’s ties to terrorism. AAMB makes a heartfelt appeal: “Honorable brothers, we intend to put the issue to you, an issue that is of utmost importance for us and will have a deep influence on our moves. The issue is your participation in a small portion [of the expenses] of our daily needs.” In this case, Fatah/AAMB (linked as the letter’s sole signatory) calls on the government to fund its illicit activities, noting the group’s inability to pay its communications and fuel costs.²¹⁴

²⁰⁹ “Appendix C: Atef Abiat (Abu Jal’if),” “Palestinian Authority Captured Documents: Main Implications,” IDF report, 7 April 2002, pg. 12.

²¹⁰ “Appendix B: Translation of Captured Document,” IDF report, 7 April 2002, pg. 9.

²¹¹ “Appendix B: Translation of Captured Document,” IDF report, 7 April 2002, pg. 9.

²¹² “Appendix D: Financing of Fatah/Tanzim and Al Aqsa Brigades Infrastructures and Activities by Arafat and his Aides (Summary of Captured Documents),” IDF report, 7 April 2002, pg. 12-3.

²¹³ “Appendix D: Financing of Fatah/Tanzim and Al Aqsa Brigades Infrastructures and Activities by Arafat and his Aides (Summary of Captured Documents),” IDF report, 7 April 2002, pg. 13.

²¹⁴ “A Captured Document Showing that in Bethlehem the Fatah (under Its Various Names) and the PA Intelligence Apparatuses Maintain a Regime of Oppression Based on Intimidation, Extortion, Unwarranted Arrests and Abuse of the Local Christian Population,” IDF report, 14 April 2002, pg. 7.

PA support for terrorism was both active and passive. In December of 2001, for example, Palestinian television broadcast a pre-recorded speech in Arabic by Arafat in which he called for “a complete cessation of any operation or actions, especially suicide attacks.”²¹⁵ His speech was less remarkable for what it said than what it failed to say: he did not outlaw, condemn, chastise, or even mention by name any specific terrorist group; he failed to condemn terrorist attacks on humanitarian grounds, calling instead for an end to attacks so as not to provide Israel with the pretext for “military aggression”; he offered no roadmap or timetable regarding specific actions the PA planned to curb the violence; and it stopped short of calling for an end to the *Intifada*.

Arafat first initiated the policy of national unity in 2000, when he invited leaders of Hamas, PIJ, PFLP, and other groups to join his “emergency cabinet” within weeks of the Second *Intifada*’s onset. In August 2001, the PA extended Hamas and PIJ an official invitation to form a “government of national unity.”²¹⁶ In December 2001, Arafat would announce an order requiring the closure of Hamas and PIJ offices yet he rescinded the order days later.²¹⁷ That same month, the official Palestinian news agency WAFA reported that the PA leadership had declared a state of emergency which stipulated that “only security personnel and other licensed persons are allowed to carry any sort of weapon.” Despite this declaration, and its relevant Oslo commitments, Arafat again disappointed as the PA did not begin the systematic confiscation of the thousands of illegal weapons in the hands of Hamas, PIJ, PFLP, PRC, and Fatah-associated groups such as the Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades.²¹⁸

This resembled similar PA behavior from several months earlier. Following the assassination of then-Israeli tourism minister Rehavam Ze’evi in October 2001 by PFLP terrorists, the PA claimed to have outlawed the military wings of Hamas, PIJ, and the PFLP. After operatives were detained, however, they were neither prosecuted nor given full prison sentences. The one Hamas terrorist to be tried and convicted in a Palestinian court, Mahmud Abu Hanud, was praised as a hero by the presiding judge who expressed his displeasure at having to sentence Abu Hanud to twelve years imprisonment for “forming armed bands.” Abu Hanud was released from prison in October 2000, and immediately orchestrated a number of Hamas suicide bombing attacks targeting Israeli civilians. He was later killed by Israeli forces.²¹⁹

In a report entitled “International Financial Aid to the Palestinian Authority Redirected to Terrorist Elements,” Israeli government analysts carefully documented disturbing evidence about

²¹⁵ Suzanne Goldenberg, “End Suicide Attacks, Says Arafat: Leader Goes on TV To Renounce Bombings of Israelis,” The Guardian (UK), December 17, 2001, available at <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2001/dec/17/israel>; For an unofficial English translation of the speech, see “The Historical Speech of President Yasser Arafat on the Occasion of Eid El-Fitr,” Jerusalem Media and Communication Center, December 16, 2001.

²¹⁶ Kylie Morris, “Palestinians Discuss Unity Government,” BBC News, August 8, 2001.

²¹⁷ Robert W. Gee, “Arafat: End All Attacks on Israel: Under Pressure To Halt Terror, Palestinian leader Makes Plea,” Austin American-Statesman, December 17, 2001; Peter Hermann, “Arafat Urges Militants to Halt Attacks on Israel: Among Palestinians and Israelis, Speech Gets Mixed Reaction,” Baltimore Sun, December 17, 2001.

²¹⁸ For an English translation of the WAFA report, see “Text: The Palestinian Leadership Declare a State of Emergency Throughout the Palestinian Territory,” Independent Media Review Analysis, December 3, 2001.

²¹⁹ “Hamas Militant Fears Jews Will Kill Him If He Goes Free: Chose To Stand Trial in Area Controlled by Palestinians,” Reuters, September 3, 2000; Lee Hockstader, “Israel Kills Key Hamas Commander: Attack Could Hurt U.S. Peace Effort,” Washington Post, November 24, 2001.

misuse of EU donor funds to finance other, unbudgeted expenditures in support of terrorism.²²⁰ Indeed, it was unclear how the PA used European cash aid, amounting to 10 million Euros per month, which was not tied to specific humanitarian or development projects. The report documents various illicit schemes through which the PA diverted funds to Fatah members engaged in terrorism, concluding that “the implication is that the PA paid salaries to hundreds of Fatah personnel who engaged in terrorism. Amongst the salary earners in this status was the commander of the al Aqsa Martyrs Brigades in Samaria [northern West Bank] (responsible for attacks in which 17 Israelis were killed), and the two murderers of the Israeli youth who was lured via the Internet to the Ramallah area where he was murdered.”²²¹

As noted, the 500,000 documents Israel seized from PA offices during *Defensive Shield* in 2002 provide extensive evidence of PA support for, and involvement in, terrorism. For example, the seized documents provide evidence that the PA deducted 3 percent of gross income from PA employee salaries (paid in part by EU funding) that was earmarked for Arafat’s Fatah. Additionally, Israeli authorities discovered over sixty copies of checks made out to various Fatah branch offices in the West Bank from the PA Finance Ministry’s “salaries account,” account number 01810058/4 at the Al-Urdan bank (Bank of Jordan P.L.C.). While many checks were dated as early as 1998-1999, predating direct EU budgetary assistance to the PA, investigators found identical documentation from 2001. For instance, in a letter on Fatah letterhead dated October 22, 2001, senior Fatah official Jamal Lafi asks that the bank allow Fatah activist Ziad Hamis Hussein Bahar to cash a NIS 10,500 check drawn on the salaries account and payable to the “Palestinian National Liberation Movement, Fatah/Abu Dis.” Even assuming that the money actually went for salaries, the salaries account is intended only to fund the salaries of PA employees, not Fatah activists (and if those being paid were actually PA officials, then these payments in cash were improper: the PA should have recorded which individual was paid how much, deducting the legally required taxes).²²²

On June 24, 2002, President Bush would settle – based on this and subsequent information that Arafat was financing terrorism – on a policy of Palestinian regime change and a conclusion that Arafat was himself an obstacle to peace.²²³

Consider, for example, the letter dated September 16, 2001, from “Palestinian Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades” to Shubaki, Arafat’s aide and former PA General Security Apparatus financial

²²⁰ “International Financial Aid to the Palestinian Authority Redirected to Terrorist Elements,” Israel Defense Forces/Military Intelligence, June 200, available at the Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs website, http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/MFAArchive/2000_2009/2002/6/International%20Financial%20Aid%20to%20the%20Palestinian%20Aut.

²²¹ “International Financial Aid to the Palestinian Authority Redirected to Terrorist Elements,” Israel Defense Forces/Military Intelligence, June 200, available at the Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs website, http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/MFAArchive/2000_2009/2002/6/International%20Financial%20Aid%20to%20the%20Palestinian%20Aut.

²²² Matthew Levitt, “Accounting and Accountability: Defining Donor Requirements for Palestinian Reform,” PolicyWatch 638, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, July 18, 2002

²²³ Glenn Kessler and Walter Pincus, “Bombing Link Swayed Bush: Reported Arafat Payment to Terror Group Shifted Stance,” *The Washington Post*, June 26, 2002

head. The letter, which requests funds for electrical and chemical materials to manufacture explosives, explains that “the cost of one ready explosive charge is 700 Shekels at least.” It continues, “We need every week 5-9 explosive charges for squads in various areas.” Handwritten notes tally the total at 20,000 NIS per month. The letter includes the cost of ammunition, adding “we need bullets on a daily basis.”²²⁴ The correspondence also features procurement requests for bombs and ammunition, revealing that the Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades is a bona fide group, with its own terrorist infrastructure and supply chain.²²⁵ Further revealing the PA’s involvement in terrorism, in a letter dated September 9, 2001, Fatah leader Hassan al Sheikh requested \$2,500 for Ra’ed el Karmi, Ziad Da’as, and Amar Qadan, Al-Aqsa terrorists involved in the January 17, 2002, Bat Mitzvah party attack in Hadera. At the bottom of the page, a handwritten note signed by Arafat on September 19 instructs the PA Treasury to allocate \$600 to each of them.²²⁶ Another captured document requests \$25,000 for a lathe, \$40,000 for a milling machine, and additional funds for other machines to build heavy weapons.”²²⁷

Other documents underscore the close cooperation between PA security services and terrorist groups, including providing such groups weapons and early warning of pending raids. One Palestinian intelligence report notes that “Jamal Switat (is) Deputy Head of the Preventive (Intelligence Apparatuses) in Jenin and responsible for the (Islamic) Jihad, he often contacts it and reports to it on the waves of arrests against them, their dates and the names of wanted men. Additionally, he supplies arms to the Hamas and to the (Islamic) Jihad by trading with it.” Another Palestinian intelligence report boasts of a particularly successful terrorist cell, organized by Ziad Da’as, and its close ties to the PA security service: “This squad carried out qualitative and successful operations. The last one in this framework was the coordination and planning of the [Bat Mitzvah party] operation in Hadera to avenge the death of the martyr Ra’ed Karmi....[Ziad Da’as’] men are very close to us and maintain constant coordination and contact with us.”²²⁸

H. Palestinian Authority control over PA security forces during the 2000-2002 period

During the 2000-2002 period, the PA exerted extensive control over its various security forces. Indeed, PA Chairman Yasser Arafat maintained personal control over these agencies by insisting that each security service report to him directly. As the evidence presented in this Declaration makes clear, Arafat himself – as well as his deputies, aides and ministers – personally approved of his security agencies’ involvement in terrorism. The PA knowingly provided salaries to members of the PA security forces involved in terrorism (indeed, they often

²²⁴ “Arafat’s and the PA’s Involvement in Terrorism (According to Captured Documents),” IDF report, 22 April 2002, http://www.terrorism-info.org.il/malam_multimedia/English/finincing/pdfs/03.pdf

²²⁵ “Arafat’s and the PA’s Involvement in Terrorism (According to Captured Documents),” IDF report, 22 April 2002, http://www.terrorism-info.org.il/malam_multimedia/English/finincing/pdfs/03.pdf

²²⁶ “Arafat’s and the PA’s Involvement in Terrorism (According to Captured Documents),” IDF report, 22 April 2002, http://www.terrorism-info.org.il/malam_multimedia/English/finincing/pdfs/03.pdf

²²⁷ “Arafat’s and the PA’s Involvement in Terrorism (According to Captured Documents),” IDF report, 22 April 2002, http://www.terrorism-info.org.il/malam_multimedia/English/finincing/pdfs/03.pdf

²²⁸ “Arafat’s and the PA’s Involvement in Terrorism (According to Captured Documents),” IDF report, 22 April 2002, http://www.terrorism-info.org.il/malam_multimedia/English/finincing/pdfs/03.pdf

justified their requests for funding by highlighting such activities) and frequently funded their operations.

Ultimately, in June 2002, the U.S. government took the public position that the PA was “tainted by terror.” The implication was that by virtue of the control it exerted over its security services, the PA could have prevented security forces from engaging in terrorism and could have further employed these services to combat the terrorism perpetrated by others. But in the early years of the Second *Intifada*, from September 2000 to 2002, State Department reports tried to skirt the issue of PA responsibility for terrorism for fear that finding the PA and PLO noncompliant with its treaty obligations would undermine U.S. efforts to revive peace talks and stem the violence of the *Intifada*.

In May 2002, the State Department submitted its semiannual PLOCCA report to Congress, assessing PLO and PA compliance with commitments made under the Israeli-Palestinian peace accords during the period of June 15, 2001 – December 15, 2001. While attempting to maintain a veneer of compliance in an effort to breathe life into the peace process mission of then-CIA Director George Tenet, the report acknowledged PA shortcomings over the reporting period.

The report acknowledges that Fatah elements “were frequently involved in acts of violence,” but maintains that there is no “conclusive evidence” that these elements acted with the prior approval and encouragement of the PLO and PA leaderships.²²⁹ According to the May PLOCCA report, there is no “conclusive evidence” that the senior leaderships of the PA or PLO were involved in planning or approving specific acts of violence.²³⁰ Evidence to the contrary reveals that Maher Fares, head of Palestinian military intelligence in Nablus, directed a terrorist cell that placed a bomb on a Tel Aviv bus on December 28, 2000, among other attacks instigated by the group.²³¹

In addition to Fares’ efforts, senior PA and PLO officials made countless incendiary public statements over the course of the second *Intifada*, such as the December 7, 2001, statement by Ikrima Sabri, the PA-employed mufti of Jerusalem, supporting suicide attacks: “we must not stand in the way of the Intifada and jihad. Rather, we must stand at their side and encourage them.” Documents recovered during *Operation Defensive Shield* included requests addressed to Faisal Husseini (then Arafat’s Jerusalem representative) for further funding of terrorist activities; orders signed by Arafat to pay Tanzim operatives; and documents relating to the U.S.-based Holy Land Foundation for Relief and Development, a Hamas front organization shut down by U.S. authorities in December 2001 and convicted of supporting Hamas in 2008.

As the May 2001 PLOCCA report was issued some four months behind schedule, the State Department made certain to issue the next PLOCCA report on time, in July 2002. The new

²²⁹ Report Pursuant to Title VIII of Public Law 101-246, Foreign Relations Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1990-91, As Amended (The PLO Commitments Compliance Act of 1989, PLOCCA, as amended), submitted May 2002 (hereafter, PLOCCA report, May 2002)

²³⁰ PLOCCA Report, May 2002

²³¹ Israeli Defense Forces - Nablus: the Infrastructure Center of Palestinian Terrorism - The PA's Involvement In Terror, <http://www.idf.il/arafat/schem/english/c.html>

report, released less than a month after President George W. Bush's call for Palestinian reform and just two days after an Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades terrorist attack which killed 7 civilians and wounded 17, broke from the May report by making specific reference to seized Palestinian documents and calling out the PLO and PA for supporting terrorism.

Echoing the May 2001 PLOCCA report, the new July 2002 PLOCCA report repeatedly used the phrase “no conclusive evidence” to qualify the failure of PA and PLO leaders to rein in or discipline AAMB, Tanzim, or PA security forces whom, the report conceded, “they clearly knew...were involved in the violence.”²³² And yet, the July 2002 report described the Palestinians’ record of honoring peace commitments as “mixed as best, with specific serious concerns about their commitment to renounce the use of terrorism and violence, assume responsibility for all PLO elements, and discipline violators.”²³³ Moreover, the report acknowledged that “some senior PLO and PA leaders did little to prevent – and in some cases encouraged – acts of violence and an atmosphere of incitement to violence.”²³⁴ The July report also informed that the PA had funded Fatah terrorists and made no “serious or sustained” efforts to suppress attacks by the Fatah-associated Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades.²³⁵

Far from suppressing attacks, over the course of *Defensive Shield* the IDF arrested and interrogated a number of mid- and high-level terror operatives who worked for the PA. For example, on April 10, 2002 the IDF arrested Zafer Abdallah Juad Abdallah Ramhan Rimawi, an officer in the Palestinian Preventive Security Services (PPSS). Rimawi, who admitted to being inducted into a Fatah terrorist cell in early 2001 and to remaining in contact with senior Fatah and Force 17 (Arafat’s security service) operatives, was personally responsible for a number of shooting attacks against Israeli civilians.²³⁶ Israeli security forces also arrested Akram Kassam, a senior officer in Palestinian military intelligence, when the IDF entered Ramallah on April 10. During his interrogation, Kassam stated that parallel to his position within the PA, he was also a Hamas activist, serving as a liaison between Hamas cells in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Kassam was personally involved in shooting attacks on buses carrying soldiers and received \$12,000 from Hamas members in Gaza to establish a Hamas infrastructure in the West Bank.²³⁷

Despite highlighting the PA’s grossly inadequate efforts to thwart Palestinian terrorism, the July 2002 PLOCCA report acknowledged general fault but assigned no specific culpability.²³⁸ Tellingly, however, the cover letter to the report – written by then-Assistant

²³² PLOCCA, July 2002

²³³ Report Pursuant to Title VIII of Public Law 101-246, Foreign Relations Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1990-91, As Amended (The PLO Commitments Compliance Act of 1989, PLOCCA, as amended), submitted July 2002 (hereafter, PLOCCA report, July 2002)

²³⁴ PLOCCA, July 2002

²³⁵ PLOCCA, July 2002

²³⁶ “Results of questioning of Palestinian detainees (Communicated by the IDF Spokesman),” Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs,” 10 April 2002.

<http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Government/Communiques/2002/Results+of+questioning+of+Palestinian+d detainees+.htm>

²³⁷ “Results of questioning of Palestinian detainees (Communicated by the IDF Spokesman),” Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs,” 10 April 2002.

<http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Government/Communiques/2002/Results+of+questioning+of+Palestinian+d detainees+.htm>

²³⁸ Section 566 (PLO Compliance Report) of the FY 02 Foreign Operations Appropriations Act (P.L. 107-115)

Secretary of State for Legislative Affairs Paul V. Kelly – issued a backhanded rebuke of PA-PLO noncompliance with its commitments to “a peaceful resolution of its conflict with Israel,” to “renounce the use of terrorism and other acts of violence,” and to “assume responsibility over all PLO elements and personnel and to assure their compliance,” among others.²³⁹ In noting that the report issued no definitive judgment of PLO compliance during the given reporting period, Kelly stated that “to make such an explicit determination at this time would not serve the national security interests of the United States.”²⁴⁰ The State Department’s failure to pass definitive judgment on PA-PLO compliance was immediately described by Congressman Lantos as “total disregard of the evidence.”²⁴¹

Following the U.S. government’s designation of the AAMB as a terrorist organization in February 2002 and four months before the release of the PLOCCA report, then-Secretary of State Colin Powell made a public demand that Arafat issue “clear and unambiguous orders to Palestinian security forces to prevent further terror attacks.”²⁴² This high level demarche indicated that at the highest levels of the U.S. government the assessment was that Arafat and the PA did indeed control the PA security forces. The PA chose not to do so, to be sure, but it could have done so at any time if only due to its control of the purse strings with which it continued to fund and arm AAMB and other terrorist elements. In fact, showing Arafat’s defiance, documents seized in his compound proved that despite multiple promises to U.S. officials, he not only refused to detain thirty-six terrorists requested by then-U.S. Middle East envoy Gen. Anthony Zinni, but authorized payment for some of them from PA coffers. Indeed, most Al-Aqsa operatives, like Mohammed Hashaika, the AAMB suicide bomber who struck Jerusalem on March 21, 2002, were current or former PA police officers and many were receiving or had received funds from the PA, often with Arafat’s blessing.²⁴³

Providing further evidence of the PA’s insincere efforts to stem the *Intifada*, just two days after his deceitful December 16, 2001 speech which called for “a complete cessation of any operation or actions, especially suicide attacks,”²⁴⁴ Arafat’s rhetoric took a noticeable turn. As he addressed a crowd outside his Ramallah headquarters, Arafat glorified Palestinian martyrdom as a means of winning Jerusalem. Citing a Qur’anic passage promising large rewards for “martyrs” fighting in the Holy Land, he declared that “one martyr of these is worth seventy.”²⁴⁵ The Middle East Media Research Institute, which translated the speech, clarifies the meaning of this passage as “one martyr on the front line in Jerusalem is worth seventy martyrs on any other front of jihad.” Arafat continued: “Today, the martyr Muhammad al-Dura [a twelve-year-old

²³⁹ PLOCCA, July 2002

²⁴⁰ PLOCCA, July 2002

²⁴¹ “Lantos Criticizes State Department on Palestinian Compliance Report,” House Committee on International Relations Press Release, July 22, 2002

²⁴² “Bush pushes Mideast cease-fire,” *Associated Press*, March 26, 2002.

²⁴³ “Information On The Terrorist Who Carried Out Today’s Suicide Bombing On King George Street In Jerusalem,” Communicated by the IDF Spokesperson and the Prime Minister’s Media Adviser), Jerusalem (March 21, 2002)

²⁴⁴ Suzanne Goldenberg, “End Suicide Attacks, Says Arafat: Leader Goes on TV To Renounce Bombings of Israelis,” *Guardian* (UK), December 17, 2001. For an unofficial English translation of the speech, see “The Historical Speech of President Yasser Arafat on the Occasion of Eid El-Fitr,” Jerusalem Media and Communication Center, December 16, 2001. <www.jmcc.org/new/01/dec/rafatspeech.htm>

²⁴⁵ “Recent Statements by Yasser Arafat,” Special Dispatch Series no. 317, Middle East Media Research Institute, December 20, 2001. <<http://memri.org/bin/articles.cgi?Page=archives&Area=sd&ID=SP31701>>

boy killed in crossfire between Israeli and Palestinian forces] and all our martyrs in paradise tell them [the Jews]: ‘We are a nation of giants, we shall defend the frontline land.’”²⁴⁶ The excited crowd fervently responded, “One million martyrs are already marching to Jerusalem.”²⁴⁷

Still more evidence reflecting the PA’s and Arafat’s failure to inhibit Palestinian terrorism is that not only did *Defensive Shield* turn up numerous documents tying Arafat and other Palestinian officials to known terrorists, it also uncovered caches of illegal weapons in the PA’s possession. These weapons were in clear violation of Israeli-Palestinian peace agreements. Within Arafat’s Mukata’ah compound in Ramallah alone, IDF soldiers found scores of munitions, pistols, automatic rifles, and empty suicide bomber belts. In addition to these items, the IDF found a number of RPG launchers, which the PA was forbidden to possess under the terms of its agreements with Israel.²⁴⁸

Those documents and illicit weapons seized in *Defensive Shield* aside, the U.S. State Department’s 2003 terrorism report explicitly took the PA to task for failing to use its security forces to combat terrorism. According to the report:

The Palestinian Authority’s efforts to thwart terrorist operations were minimal in 2002. Israeli military operations in the West Bank and Gaza Strip degraded a PA security apparatus that was already hobbled by corruption, infighting, and poor leadership. Some personnel in the security services, including several senior officers, have continued to assist terrorist operations. Incidents such as the seizure in January of the *Karine-A*, a ship carrying weapons that Iran planned to deliver to the PA, further called into question the PA’s ability and desire to help prevent terrorist operations. President Bush expressed ‘disappointment’ in Arafat, indicating the intercepted shipment would encourage terrorism. In June, President Bush called for a new Palestinian leadership ‘not compromised by terror.’²⁴⁹

The PA’s counterterrorism performance did not improve the following year. The State Department’s 2004 terrorism report lamented that “Unfortunately, the Palestinian Authority (PA) continued to take insufficient steps to stop terrorist operations.”²⁵⁰

Moreover, much of the PA’s direct contact with, and oversight of, AAMB involved funding and arming AAMB cells. This was often accomplished through direct contact between AAMB operatives and senior PA officials, including Arafat himself, who would then instruct security services and other PA agencies to follow through with financial support and weapons provision. For example, a letter addressed to Arafat from “your sons, Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades – Southern Area,” included the logos of both AAMB and Fatah on the letterhead and a joint

²⁴⁶ “Recent Statements by Yasser Arafat,” Special Dispatch Series no. 317, Middle East Media Research Institute, December 20, 2001. <<http://memri.org/bin/articles.cgi?Page=archives&Area=sd&ID=SP31701>>

²⁴⁷ “Arafat: All Palestinians Are Martyrs,” *Jerusalem Post*, December 18, 2001.

²⁴⁸ Matthew Levitt and Seth Wikas, “Defensive Shield Counterterrorism Accomplishments ,” Policy 377, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, April 17, 2002

²⁴⁹ U.S. Department of State, “Patterns of Global Terrorism 2002,” April 30, 2003, available at <http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/crt/2002/html/index.htm>.

²⁵⁰ U.S. Department of State, “Patterns of Global Terrorism 2003,” April 29, 2004, available at <http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/crt/2003/31638.htm>.

stamp of the two organizations at the bottom. According to the letter, it was delivered from AAMB operatives to Arafat through “the fighting brother, Nabil Amru, the Minister for Parliamentary Affairs, May the Almighty protect him.”²⁵¹ Indeed, this particular letter justified the request for funding by noting the affiliation of the AAMB operatives with both Fatah and PA security services and by highlighting the fact that some of them were wanted by Israeli authorities and others were already in Israeli jails.²⁵²

In addition to AAMB, Arafat's Force 17 presidential security forces as well as the Fatah-linked Tanzim militia engaged in numerous attacks, including bombings, roadside ambushes, and shooting attacks. For example, Jamal Mustafa Ahwil, Tanzim head in the Jenin refugee camp, was responsible for the suicide bombings that took place on November 27, 2002, in Afula and on March 21, 2002, in Jerusalem. Under the guidance of Fatah secretary-general Marwan Barghouti – and often paralleling their day jobs as members of the various Fatah-dominated Palestinian security organizations – Fatah-associated elements have conducted numerous terror attacks with weapons, funding, and logistical support from senior PA officials.²⁵³ Nasser Abu Hamid, a founder of AAMB, admitted that Barghouti was involved in procuring and paying for weapons used in attacks on Israelis and that explosives used in Al-Aqsa attacks came from Force 17 stockpiles.²⁵⁴

I. Authenticity of Documents Seized by IDF in Operation Defensive Shield

Some have questioned the authenticity of the damning documents confiscated by Israel during its various West Bank raids. Yet, Ambassador Francis X. Taylor, former State Department coordinator for counterterrorism, commented on May 21, 2002, “We don’t have any question about the authenticity of the documents provided by the Israeli Government.”²⁵⁵ Noting the “credible evidence” Israelis authorities uncovered in *Operation Defensive Shield*, New York Congressman Benjamin Gilman stated for the record that “the authenticity of this evidence is confirmed by U.S. counterterrorism authorities.”²⁵⁶ Indeed, the State Department’s 2003 terrorist report concluded that “Documents seized by the Israelis and information gleaned from the interrogation of arrested al-Aqsa members indicate that Palestinian Authority (PA) and Fatah

²⁵¹ “The ‘Al Aqsa Martyrs Brigades’ (on US State Department list of terror organizations) and the Fatah Organization are one and the same, and Yasser Arafat is their leader and commander,” IDF/Military Intelligence report dated 3 May 2002, http://www.terrorism-info.org.il/malam_multimedia/English/ya/ya_hp.htm

²⁵² “The ‘Al Aqsa Martyrs Brigades’ (on US State Department list of terror organizations) and the Fatah Organization are one and the same, and Yasser Arafat is their leader and commander,” IDF/Military Intelligence report dated 3 May 2002, http://www.terrorism-info.org.il/malam_multimedia/English/ya/ya_hp.htm

²⁵³ Matthew Levitt and Ehud Waldoks, “The Return of Palestinian Nationalist Terrorism,” Policy 379, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, May 3, 2002

²⁵⁴ “Statement of Indictment: Nasser (Bin Mohammed Yusuf) Naji Abu-Hamid,” Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, July 19, 2002. http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/MFAArchive/2000_2009/2002/7/Statement%20of%20Indictment-%20Nasser%20-Bin%20Mohammed%20Yusu

²⁵⁵ “State’s Taylor Summarizes Annual Global Terrorism Report,” *Washington File*, U.S. Department of State International Information Programs, May 21, 2002, <http://www.usinfo.state.gov/topical/pol/terror/02052105.htm>

²⁵⁶ Statement by Senator Benjamin A. Gilman, House International Relations Subcommittee on the Middle East and South Asia, July 11, 2002. A number of other Members of Congress Echoed Sen. Gilman’s sentiments in the course of the hearing. http://commdocs.house.gov/committees/intlrel/hfa80641.000/hfa80641_0f.htm

members, including Chairman Yasir Arafat, made payments to al-Aqsa members known to have been involved in violence against Israelis.”²⁵⁷

Perhaps even more telling was the on-camera reaction of a PIJ operative when he found out documents seized in *Operation Defensive Shield* revealed his cooperation with PA security services. In an interview with *60 Minutes*, Haj Ali Safuri, a senior Palestinian Islamic Jihad terrorist now in Israeli custody, inadvertently verified their authenticity. Upon hearing himself described in Palestinian Authority documents as a prominent terrorist leader who had engineered at least ten suicide attacks, Safuri’s only response was to ask, “Truthfully, I mean, how did you get this from the Palestinian Authority? These are secret documents. They are not supposed to be disclosed.”²⁵⁸

V. CONCLUSION.

The information and conclusions in this report, based on my knowledge, experience, training and education, and after reviewing the kinds of sources and documents typical among experts in my field, comport with the findings of my own primary field research conducted on the ground, in the region. It is my expert opinion that on its own, and in close cooperation with other militant groups (including U.S.-designated Foreign Terrorist Organizations), the PFLP has carried out a significant number of terrorist attacks.

As a component element of the PLO, and in often close cooperation with the PA, the PFLP was uniquely positioned to leverage its formal and informal relationships with these groups and their leaders to secure funding, weapons, safe haven, and a variety of forms of support for its acts of terrorism and political violence.

Over the course of the Second *Intifada*, elements of the Palestinian Authority both actively and passively supported terrorist activities. PA officials and agencies not only officially tolerated terrorist activity; they also funded, armed, and at times cooperated with terrorist groups, including the PFLP. The fact that the PA/PLO gave the PFLP free rein in PA-controlled territories is itself a significant form of assistance, given that absent a local geographic platform the PFLP's operational abilities in the West Bank would have been severely limited.

The PFLP engages in acts of blatant terrorism targeting civilians. Raising or providing funds for the PFLP directly contributes to the group’s ability to carry out such attacks and stands in blatant violation of the designation of the PFLP of a terrorist group by the U.S. and other nations. While the PFLP has not carried out attacks targeting the West since the 1970’s, Western intelligence officials remain concerned they could resume such tactics in the future. On February 6, 2002, Director of Central Intelligence George Tenet testified that if groups like the PFLP, PIJ,

²⁵⁷ U.S. Department of State, “Patterns of Global Terrorism 2002,” April 30, 2003, available at <http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/crt/2002/html/index.htm>.


²⁵⁸ Interview conducted by Lesley Stahl as part of “The Arafat Papers,” a segment on *60 Minutes*, Central Broadcasting System, September 29, 2002; a partial transcript of the program was posted online by Independent Media Review Analysis at www.imra.org.il/story.php3?id=1388

or Hamas "feel that U.S. actions are threatening their existence, they may begin targeting Americans directly, as Hizballah's terrorist wing already does."²⁵⁹

There is broad consensus that the PFLP carried out the February 16, 2002, bombing attack at a pizza parlor in which Keren Shatsky and Rachel Thaler were murdered, and Leor Thaler, Hillel Trattner, Ronit Trattner, Steven Braun, and Chana Friedman were injured. The explosion killed one more person, and injured many more. The PA and PLO's decades-long provision of material support to the PFLP in the years prior to that attack directly contributed to the group's organizational and operational ability, circa 2002, to carry out such a terrorist attack.

I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct:

Executed on: September 27, 2021



Dr. Matthew Levitt

²⁵⁹ George Tenet, "Worldwide Threat - Converging Dangers in a Post 9/11 World", Testimony of Director of Central Intelligence, Before The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence – February 6, 2002